SUPREME COURT OF SINGAPORE
5 July 2024
Case summary
Credit Suisse Trust Limited v Ivanishvili Bidzina and 4 Ors [2024] SGCA(I) 5
Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore — Civil Appeal No 10 of 2023
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Decision of the Court of Appeal (delivered by Judge of Appeal Steven Chong):
CA/CAS 10/2023 is an appeal by Credit Suisse Trust Limited (“CS Trust”) against the decision of the trial judge (the “Judge”) to award the respondents US$742.73m in compensation for CS Trust’s breach of fiduciary duties. In 2004, Credit Suisse approached the first respondent, Mr Bidzina Ivanishvili (“Mr Ivanishvili”), with a proposal to establish a trust over assets exceeding US$1.1bn. CS Trust was the trustee of that trust, for which the respondents were the beneficiaries. Assets under the trust (the “Trust Assets”) were held in accounts with another member of the Credit Suisse Group (the “Trust Accounts”), Credit Suisse AG (“CS Bank”). CS Trust’s breaches of its fiduciary duties allowed one Mr Patrice Lescaudron (“Mr Lescaudron”), Mr Ivanishvili’s relationship manager at CS Bank from 2006 until 2015, to commit fraud upon the Trust Assets. Mr Lescaudron was convicted by the Swiss courts and was found to have not only misappropriated from the Trust Assets, but also to have covertly transferred and manipulated them for the purposes of concealing and covering losses in other client’s accounts. Mr Lescaudron’s actions caused substantial losses to the respondents, the quantification of which also forms a key issue on appeal.
Pertinent and significant points of the judgment
• A tortious duty of care and a fiduciary duty are distinct duties. The duty of care targets careless and incompetence. It measures the performance of the tortfeasor against an objective standard of reasonable behaviour. In contrast, the fiduciary duty targets disloyalty, mere incompetence is not enough. The difference between the two lies in the person’s state of mind in performing. Although there can be overlap between the two in the factual circumstances of a breach, they are neither binary nor mutually exclusive: [31], [49]–[53].
• Fiduciary duties are not limited to the no-profit rule and no-conflict rule. An express trustee owes a fiduciary duty to perform the trust honestly and in good faith for the benefit of, and in the interest of, the beneficiaries of the trust: at [39]–[42].
• To act in good faith, trustees must not simply refrain from acting in bad faith, something more is required. Trustees must act in good faith in the performance of their duties and in the exercise of their powers and are required to act in circumstances where they know that the interests of the beneficiaries are at risk of harm: at [44]–[53].
• CS Trust was in breach of its fiduciary duty. CS Trust ought to have informed and notified the respondents of its knowledge that large sums of money were leaving the trust without authorisation: [55]–[59].
• CS Trust was in breach of the no-conflict rule. CS Trust preferred the business interests of Credit Suisse over the duties it owed to the respondents: at [60]–[61].
• Once the respondents showed that there was a breach of such a duty, and that loss has been sustained, a rebuttable presumption arises that CS Trust’s breaches caused the loss. CS Trust would have to show that the respondents would have suffered the loss in spite of its breach: at [62]–[64].
• The appeal was allowed in part in respect of quantification of the respondents’ loss. The Judge’s award of US$742.73m in compensation was to be adjusted based on changes made to the specifications of the Whole Portfolio Model and Benchmark Portfolios: [96]–[159].
Background to the appeal and the material facts
1 Credit Suisse promoted their trust services to Mr Ivanishvili in 2004. Mr Ivanishvili then agreed to their proposal to establish a trust over assets exceeding US$1.1bn (the “Mandalay Trust”). The Mandalay Trust had the objective of “Inheritance Planning and Asset Holding” and was to be for the benefit of Mr Ivanishvili and his family, the second to fifth respondents (collectively, the “respondents”). CS Trust was appointed the trustee of the Mandalay Trust. CS Trust is a wholly owned subsidiary of Credit Suisse Trust AG (“CS Trust AG”). The Trust Assets were deposited with CS Bank, in accounts at branches in Geneva (“CS Bank (CH)”) and Singapore (“CS Bank (SG)”). Clementi Limited (“Clementi”), another related company wholly owned by CS Trust, was appointed the authorised signatory of the Trust Accounts. This meant that payments could (ostensibly) only be made out of Trust Accounts upon Clementi’s signed instructions. Mr Ivanishvili, on the other hand, was never appointed as an authorised signatory of the Trust Accounts: [5]–[8].
2 Mr Lescaudron was Mr Ivanishvili’s relationship manager at CS Bank from 2006 until 2015, when his fraud was discovered. Mr Lescaudron was then convicted by the Swiss courts and was found to have not only misappropriated from the Mandalay Trust, but also to have covertly transferred and manipulated the Trust Assets for the purposes of concealing and covering losses in other clients’ accounts, losses which Mr Lescaudron had also caused. Amongst other acts of subterfuge, Mr Lescaudron executed fraudulent investments orders by forging Mr Ivanishvili’s signature. A significant (but by no means the only) aspect of Mr Lescaudron’s fraud took the form of Unauthorised Payments Away (“UPAs”), a term used internally by Credit Suisse to refer to a type of high-risk transaction.: [10]–[11].
3 Mr Lescaudron was never formally authorised to deal with the Trust Assets. Nevertheless, Mr Lescaudron was allowed to do so with impunity between 2006 to 2015. In particular, the UPAs started in November 2006, several months after Mr Lescaudron took over as Mr Ivanishvili’s relationship manager in July 2006 and was allowed to persist unabated until 2015. This was notwithstanding the fact that CS Trust was aware of the UPAs since 5 December 2006 and had expressed concerns about them: [13]–[22].
4 Even after the collapse of the value of the Trust Assets in 2015, CS Trust did not immediately notify the respondents of this very significant development: [23].
5 CS Trust admits that it breached its duty to safeguard the Trust Assets by failing to take steps to detect and prevent Mr Lescaudron’s misappropriations. CS Trust admits that it should have contacted Mr Ivanishvili directly and should have ensured that movements out of the Trust Accounts were authorised: [26].
Decision on appeal
CS Trust’s breach of duty to act honestly and in good faith in the interest of the beneficiary
6 Fiduciary duties are not limited only to the no-profit rule and the no-conflict rule. An express trustee owes a fiduciary duty to perform the trust honestly and in good faith for the benefit of, and in the interest of, the beneficiaries of the trust: [39]–[42].
7 What the duty of good faith entails is invariably contextual. To act in good faith, a trustee must not simply refrain from acting in bad faith, something more is required. The trustee’s fiduciary duty to perform the trust honestly and in good faith for the benefit of, and in the interest of, the beneficiaries of the trust can manifest in at least two ways. The first requires a trustee to act in good faith in the performance of their duties and in their exercise of their powers. The second requires trustees to act in circumstances where the trustee knows that the interests of the beneficiaries are at risk of harm. This fiduciary duty is clearly distinct from a non-fiduciary duty to act with skill, care, and diligence. at [44]–[53].
8 Although both the tortious duty of care and a fiduciary duty entail a scrutiny of the conduct of the person subject to the duty, they are distinct duties. The duty of care targets careless and incompetence. It measures the performance of the tortfeasor against an objective standard of reasonable behaviour. In contrast, the fiduciary duty targets disloyalty, mere incompetence is not enough. The difference between the two lies in the person’s state of mind in performing. Although there can be overlap between the two in the factual circumstances of a breach, they are neither binary nor mutually exclusive. A person subject to both duties may, in certain circumstances, be in breach of both duties: [31], [49]–[53].
9 CS Trust was in breach of its fiduciary duty to perform the trust honestly and in good faith for the benefit of, and in the interests of, the respondents. CS Trust ought to have informed and notified the respondents of its knowledge that large sums of money were leaving the trust without authorisation. CS Trust knew and was alarmed by the significant volume (in terms of rate and quantum) of UPAs carried out by Mr Lescaudron early on. The risk of fraud was expressly raised. Yet, CS Trust did nothing for several years to inform Mr Ivanishvili of the ever-increasing volume of UPAs. At the very least, CS Trust turned a blind eye and abdicated its duty to perform the trust honestly and in good faith: at [55]–[59].
10 CS Trust was in breach of the no-conflict rule as it preferred the business interests of Credit Suisse over the duties it owed to the respondents. at [60]–[61].
11 With respect to CS Trust’s breaches of its fiduciary duties, once the respondents established that loss has been sustained, a rebuttable presumption arises that CS Trust’s breaches caused the loss. CS Trust would have to show that the respondents would have suffered the loss in spite of its breach: [62]–[64].
Quantification of compensation
12 The remedy of equitable compensation seeks to place the respondents in a position they would have been in had there been no breach of fiduciary duty. This was done with the assistance of forensic accounting experts and wealth management experts. The wealth management experts constructed “Benchmark Portfolios” that were alternative medium-risk portfolios for the various accounts the Trust Assets were held in. The forensic accounting experts then used the Benchmark Portfolios to project what the returns would have been for each account if the Trust Assets had been invested in accordance with those Benchmark Portfolios. Various models (the “Models”) were applied to calculate the compensation owed to the respondents, based on the different proportions of Trust Assets in the assessment: at [69]–[70].
13 It was accepted that if CS Trust had advised Mr Ivanishvili directly by 30 March 2008 (at the very latest) about Mr Lescaudron’s misconduct, as it was duty bound to do, it was more probable than not that Mr Ivanishvili would have moved the Trust Assets to another professional trustee. The “Whole Portfolio Model” which assumes that at a defined date, the Trust Assets were no longer invested in the Trust Accounts but were instead invested in accordance with the Benchmark Portfolios, is an estimation of how a competent professional trustee would have performed and is most appropriate. Trust Assets which Mr Ivanishvili had himself invested or authorised must be excluded in determining the value of Trust Assets to be accounted for under the Whole Portfolio Model: [87]–[94].
14 The experts use different specifications for the Models and in their differing Benchmark Portfolios. The former affects the portion of Trust Assets to be accounted for under the Whole Portfolio Model, the shortfall for which CS Trust needs to compensate the respondents. The latter affects the construction of the Benchmark Portfolios and the corresponding rates of return used. In constructing an alternative investment portfolio, it is important to avoid doing so in the abstract or from the perspective of a hypothetical reasonable person. The construction should be done (as far as possible) with reference specifically to Mr Ivanishvili and the factual matrix of the case. This includes a consideration of what can be discerned about Mr Ivanishvili’s investment preferences and risk appetite, and must necessarily consider any other objective facts relating to Mr Ivanishvili’s likely behaviour: [95]–[96].
15 The departures from the Judge’s decision pertain to instances where the expert evidence preferred by the Judge was found to have been against the weight of the factual evidence, or where the point was not expressly addressed by the Judge in the decision below: [96].
A summary of the various specifications relating to the quantification of damages which were reversed on appeal
16 Mr Ivanishvili had admitted under cross-examination that he was generally involved in authorising hedge fund investments. His broad concession clearly called for clarification during re-examination but this was not done. The starting point was thus that all hedge fund investments ought to be prima facie excluded from the Whole Portfolio Model, unless the respondents are able to show otherwise. CS Trust accepts that the respondents ought to be compensated for the hedge fund investments that were fraudulent, unsuitable or overconcentrated: [101]–[108].
17 Ms Mayr’s (CS Trust’s expert) asset allocation of including alternative investments for the CS Life Meadowsweet Benchmark Portfolio is to be preferred over Mr Morrey’s (the respondents’ expert) allocation which did not include alternative investments, which the Judge had adopted. This was consistent with Mr Ivanishvili’s investment risk appetite that included alternative investments in his portfolios: [119]–[128].
18 Ms Mayr’s approach of choosing the alternative investment indices should have been preferred over Mr Morrey’s approach. Ms Mayr’s approach is true to the index specified in the Soothsayer mandate, unlike Mr Morrey’s which relies on an index which has incomplete data: [129]–[136].
19 Ms Mayr’s approach of using one global benchmark to achieve geographical diversity of equities indices should have been preferred over Mr Morrey’s approach of using three regional total return benchmarks: [137]–[142].
20 The Judge’s acceptance of Mr Morrey’s exclusion of any fees payable for portfolio management of assets in his alternative Benchmark Portfolios that were invested in exchange traded funds (“ETFs”) was incorrect. The fact that the ETFs were reported to be net of fees was only relevant in a situation where a customer invested directly into the ETF, bypassing the use of a discretionary mandate. This did not accord with the facts of the present case where the experts were to assess what would have happened to the value of the Trust Assets assuming that there was an active manager: [154]–[158].
Conclusion
21 The appeal was allowed in part in respect of quantification of the respondents’ loss. The Judge’s award of US$742.73m in compensation was to be adjusted based on changes made to the specifications of the Whole Portfolio Model and Benchmark Portfolios: [159].
This summary is provided to assist in the understanding of the Court’s grounds of decision. It is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the Court. All numbers in bold font and square brackets refer to the corresponding paragraph numbers in the Court’s grounds of decision.