XCR v XCS

1 Section 112(10) of the Women’s Charter 1961 (“Charter”) stipulates that a property “acquired” in certain circumstances by one party to a marriage is a “matrimonial asset”. Suppose that before marrying “W”, “H” purchases a property and pays for it partially using his own funds. Suppose further that “H” then pays the balance of the purchase price during marriage by using (a) his parents’ funds and (b) the property’s rental income. Has “H” “acquired” the property before or during marriage? Is the property a matrimonial asset? These issues arose in the present case.

2 These are the background facts. The Plaintiff (“Husband”) and Defendant (“Wife”) grew up in the People’s Republic of China and were married there in February 2015. ¹ Later that same year, they came to Singapore because the Husband had found employment here. They had a son in Singapore (D.O.B. XX February 2020). In 2023, the parties filed cross-applications for divorce. Interim judgement was granted in July 2023 – thus ending a marriage of about 8½ years. Following their divorce, the ancillary matters came before me.

3 I begin with the division of the matrimonial assets.

4 The parties hold various assets in joint and individual names. It is not disputed that the following are matrimonial assets. (Note. Only assets above $100 in value have been reflected below.)

(a) Assets held in joint names –

(b) Assets in the Husband’s sole name ⁴ –

(c) Assets in the Wife’s sole name ⁶ –

5 In addition to the assets in [4(b)], the Husband has a residential property in Beijing. It was purchased in 2011, i.e., about four years before the marriage (2015). The Husband had paid the bulk of its purchase price before the marriage. The balance of the purchase price was paid during marriage via (a) funds from his parents (between 2016 to 2017) and (b) rental income from the property. ⁹ It is not disputed that the Wife did not make any payment towards the property. ¹⁰

6 According to the Wife, the Beijing property is a “matrimonial asset” and she should thus be given a share of it. To support her case, she relied on s 112(10)(a)(i) of the Charter. ¹¹ According to this provision, a “matrimonial asset” includes –

any asset acquired before the marriage by one party or both parties to the marriage – ordinarily used or enjoyed by both parties or one or more of their children while the parties are residing together for shelter or transportation or for household, education, recreational, social or aesthetic purposes ...

[emphasis added]

7 I reproduce below the Wife’s submissions are to why the Beijing property is matrimonial asset pursuant to s 112(10)(a)(i): ¹²

(a) The Wife and the Husband began living together at the Beijing property in October 2014, before their marriage registration in February 2015. They continued to reside there after the marriage, until the Plaintiff’s relocation to Singapore in May 2015.

(b) The Beijing property was jointly renovated and prepared specifically for marriage, with the Wife personally overseeing the renovation, choosing furniture, fittings and interior design, with clear evidence of intent to use the property as the first matrimonial home have been provided by the Wife.

(c) Even after the parties moved to Singapore, the Wife continued to reside there for a period with her mother, and the parties returned to live in the Beijing home from May 2017 to August 2018 during the Husband’s employment in China.

(d) The parties also hosted both sides of the extended family in the Beijing home for festive celebrations, including Chinese New Year and birthdays — affirming its role as the central family dwelling.

(e) Even after relocating to Singapore, the parties resumed residence at the Beijing property when the Husband worked in China between May 2017 and August 2018. It is significant that they did not lease out the property prior to this period, a telling fact that shows the property was held back for personal use rather than treated as an income generating investment.

(f) The family’s use of the property was consistent and deeply embedded. The couple celebrated multiple Chinese New Years, birthdays, and reunions in this home with both sides of their family. It was a site of joyful family gatherings and shared tradition, further cementing its emotional and symbolic status as the nucleus of the marriage.

(g) The parties deliberately left the property vacant for the bulk of the marriage rather than leasing it out — a significant financial sacrifice that underscores the symbolic and practical role of the Beijing home as a family sanctuary, not an investment.

(h) It is further not disputed that the parties have resided in the matrimonial home during the significant months leading to their marriage.

8 The Husband submitted that the Beijing property is not a matrimonial asset. He gave the following reasons. ¹³

(a) Contrary to the Wife’s evidence, she did not participate in either the renovations of the Beijing property or the selection of its furniture and lighting. Such works were carried out by the Husband with the assistance of a home designer and a foreman. As the parties were dating at the material time, the Wife would occasionally visit the renovation site and he would seek her inputs on the renovations.

(b) The Husband had allowed the Wife and her mother to stay in the Beijing property shortly after the marriage. This was because he did not want them to incur rental expenses for their short stay in Beijing.

(c) Contrary to the Wife’s evidence, the parties did not have the 2015 Chinese New Year reunion dinner at the Beijing property. This dinner took place before the marriage and was held at the property for convenience.

(d) When the Husband was working in China, the Wife had lived with him at the Beijing property for only about nine months – in June 2017 and from January to August 2018. Contrary to her evidence, she did not stay there in May and July to December 2017 as she was studying at NTU at the material time.

(e) Apart from the periods stated in (d) above, the Beijing property was either rented out by the Husband or used to house him, his relatives and/or his family members.

(f) The Husband was the sole party who dealt with the Beijing property. He did not need to account to the Wife for such dealings.

(g) The Wife did not make any mention about the Beijing property in her first ancillary matters affidavit. This showed that she did not regard the property as their matrimonial home.

9 The Wife’s case that the Beijing property is matrimonial asset is based on s 112(10)(a)(i) of the Charter. Accordingly, the issues are as follows. Was the Beijing property “acquired” by the Husband before the marriage? If the answer is yes, then was the property “ordinarily used by both parties ... while [they were] residing together for shelter”. If the answer to also yes, then the Beijing property is a matrimonial asset. I will now address these issues.

10 At the outset, I note that the parties took the position that the Beijing property had been acquired before their marriage.

11 I have difficulties accepting this position. Let me explain.

(a) According to s 112(10)(b) of the Charter, matrimonial assets include “any other asset of any nature acquired during the marriage by one party or both parties to the marriage”. (emphasis added)

(b) Courts have interpreted the word “acquired” in s 112(10)(b) as referring not merely to the point of purchase of an asset, but to the entire course of its acquisition. See, for instance, BHN v BHO [2013] SGHC 91 (“BHN”) at [36] where the court accepted the following observations in Chee Kok Choon v Sern Kuang Eng [2005] 4 MLJ 461 (“Chee Kok Choon”):

9  ... The word ‘acquired’ is not the same as ‘purchased’ as ordinarily understood. In a family law setting, especially in terms of division of matrimonial assets, a down-payment may have been paid, and one party may continue mortgage instalments for the next 15 or 20 years. In such a case, the ‘acquisition’ continues until the asset is fully acquired. ...

[emphasis added]

(c) Courts have applied the above interpretation of “acquired” to cases where the property was purchased by the owning spouse before marriage and the mortgage instalments were paid using the owning spouse’s CPF funds during marriage. Here are some examples.

(i) BHN –

39 ... even if Lagoon View was purchased before the marriage, the plaintiff continued to service the housing loan through her CPF contributions during the marriage, until 1998 when the property became fully paid up. If the plaintiff had not been paying for the housing loan, any CPF contributions earned by her during the marriage would have remained in her CPF account and would have to be included in the pool of matrimonial assets for the purpose of the determination of ancillary matters. As such, at least a portion of Lagoon View should be viewed as having been “acquired during the marriage” and a matrimonial asset. Simply put, the fact that the defendant made no financial contribution to Lagoon View is irrelevant as matrimonial assets rightly include assets acquired by either spouse’s personal efforts during the marriage.

[emphasis in italics is in original text; emphasis in bold is added]

(ii) BGT v BGU [2013] SGHC 50 (“BGT”) –

29  ... it is well established that any contributions to [the husband’s] account from moneys earned after the marriage would form part of the matrimonial assets. If the husband had not been paying for the Tanamera property, his monthly contributions during the marriage would have remained in his CPF account and there would have been no doubt at the end of the marriage that those contributions would have to be included as part of the matrimonial assets. ...

(d) In our case, the Husband did not, during marriage, use his CPF funds to pay the mortgage loan for the Beijing property. Instead, the loan was paid with (i) funds from his parents and (ii) rental income from the property. Does the source of funds used to pay the mortgage loan affect the identity of the person “acquiring” the property?

(e) In THL v THM [2015] SGHCF 11 (“THL”), the court answered the above question in the negative.

41 ... The question which next arises is whether, on the Father’s argument, the London Properties should nevertheless be taken out of the scope of s 112(10)(b) because, as he says, the funds used for repaying the mortgage loans come primarily from the rental income generated on those properties and, to a lesser extent, his pre-matrimonial income. In other words, BHN only applied where the acquisition is serviced by “active earnings”; in BHN the acquisition was paid with salary earned. The unarticulated premise of this argument is that notwithstanding that an asset appears to have been acquired during the course of a particular marriage, the court should go on to scrutinise the source of funds for the acquisition.

42 In my judgment, this does not accord with the wording of s 112(10)(b), which simply directs the court’s inquiry to the timing of the acquisition of the property concerned. ... Whether he funds a specific investment within this portfolio out of his salary or a pre-existing pool of money is arbitrary.

[emphasis in italics is in original text; emphasis in bold is added]

(f) To sum-up –

(i) Courts have interpreted the word “acquired” in s 112(10)(b) as referring not merely to the point of purchase of a property, but to the entire course of its acquisition. A property is “acquired” only when it has been fully paid for.

(ii) If the owning spouse continues to pay for the property during marriage for the purpose of acquiring it, then it is a matrimonial asset pursuant to s 112(10)(b). This is so regardless of the source of the spouse’s payments.

(g) This leads to the next issue. Should the above interpretation of “acquired” in s 112(10)(b) similarly apply to the same word in s 112(10)(a)(i)? In my view, the answer should be yes.

(i) First, it is settled law that a piece of statute should be construed as a whole and purposively. It is well accepted that “the Parliamentary draftsman would not indulge in elegant variation, but would keep to a particular term when wishing to convey a particular meaning”. In line with this, a word or a phrase has the same meaning throughout the statute unless the contrary intention is shown. See e.g., Chng Gim Huat v Public Prosecutor [2000] 2 SLR(R) 360 at [101]; Fernandez Joseph Ferdinent v Public Prosecutor [2007] 3 SLR(R) 65 at [24]; Woon Brothers Investments Pte Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No. 461 [2011] 4 SLR 777 at [19]. In the present case, there is nothing to suggest that Parliament had intended the word “acquired” in s 112(10)(a)(i) and s 112(10)(b) is to have different meanings.

(ii) Second, to interpret the word “acquired” in s 112(10)(b) and s 112(10)(a)(i) differently will mean that the same property in the scenarios in [11(c)] and [11(e)] above is simultaneously (1) a matrimonial asset (when construed under s 112(10)(b)) and (2) not a matrimonial asset (when construed under s 112(10)(a)(i)). This is absurd.

12 I am mindful that there is dictum in USB v USA [2020] 2 SLR 588 (“USB”) that may suggest that a property can be treated as having been “acquired” even though it has not been fully paid for. For ease of reference, I reproduced substantively [19] of USB. Note in particular [19(c)] –

19 ... Section 112 of the Charter contemplates that assets in at least three categories may be subject to the court’s powers of division. The classes of assets that the parties may possess are:

(a) “Quintessential matrimonial assets” ...: these are assets which either spouse derived from income earned during the marriage or to which either spouse or both spouses obtained legal title during the marriage by applying their own money, and the matrimonial home, whenever and however acquired. The entire value of these assets assessed as at the ancillary matters date (generally) will go into the pool.

(b) “Transformed matrimonial assets”: we use this term to denote assets which were acquired before the marriage by one spouse (or, more rarely, by both spouses), but ... which were ordinarily used or enjoyed by both parties or their children while residing together for purposes such as shelter, transport, household use, etc. Once transformed, the whole asset goes into the pool but if there is no transformation then, subject to (c) below, any asset acquired before the marriage even if acquired by both parties would be dealt with in accordance with general principles of property law.

(c) “Pre-marriage assets”: these are assets that either spouse acquired before the marriage and ... which are not used for family purposes. These stay out of the pool unless ... they are partially paid for during the marriage by the owning spouse with income that would have been a quintessential matrimonial asset had it been saved up rather than expended on the pre-marriage asset. Then, the proportion of the value of the asset that was acquired during the marriage should go into the pool.

[emphasis added]

13 In my view, USB do not preclude the view taken in [11(g)] above. First, the court there did not seek to lay down a definition for the word “acquired” in s 112(10)(a)(i). Second, there is nothing in its judgement to show that the court had been alerted to the caselaw and considerations in [11] above on the interpretation of the word “acquired”.

14 Thus, in line with well settled caselaw, since the purchase price of the Beijing property was paid by the Husband (via funds from his parents and the property’s rental income) during the marriage, the property is a “matrimonial asset” pursuant to s 112(10)(b).

15 Given the above, there is no need for me to further determine whether the Beijing property qualifies as a matrimonial asset under s 112(10)(a)(i).

16 However, since the parties had made substantial submissions on this issue, I will make some observations regarding this.

17 I begin by setting out the applicable principles. To qualify as a matrimonial asset under s 112(10)(a)(i), a property must satisfy three requirements.

(a) “Residing together”. First, both parties must have resided “together” at the property. Section 112(10)(a)(i) is not met if only one of them had resided there: UZK v UZL [2020] 3 SLR 1248 at [35]; WAH v WAG [2024] SGFC 6 at [66].

(b) “For shelter”. Second, the property must have been used “for shelter”. Unlike s 112(10)(a)(ii) (which provides for the transformation of solely owned assets into matrimonial assets by way of “substantial improvement”), it is not necessary under s 112(10)(a)(i) for the property to have been used for shelter “during the marriage”. In other words, a property may be transformed into a matrimonial asset under s 112(10)(a)(i) even if the parties’ residence at the property had occurred before their marriage.

(c) “Ordinarily used”. Finally, the parties’ residence at the property must be of “sufficient regularity and frequency”: USB at [24]; CLB v CLC [2022] 1 SLR 658 at [26]; TNC v TND [2016] 3 SLR 1172 at [18]; BJS v BJT [2013] 4 SLR 41 (“BJS”) at [23] and [24]. Let me elaborate.

(i) The requirement of ordinary usage is intended to prevent the non-owning spouse from enjoying an “unmerited windfall”. Put in another way, the purpose of this requirement is to prevent a party from acquiring a pre-marriage property by simply staying there “casually” or “occasionally” without contributing to the “marital partnership”: Wan Lai Cheng v Quek Seow Kee [2012] 4 SLR 405 at [43]; WQP v WQQ [2024] 2 SLR 557 at [38].

(ii) In line with this, courts have held that a property is not a matrimonial asset under s 112(10)(a)(i) in the following cases: (1) it was occupied only occasionally during a two-year marriage (BJS at [23] and [24]), (2) it was a holiday home that was occupied for only 21 days in a 14-year marriage (Ryan Neil John v Berger Rosaline [2000] 3 SLR(R) 647 at [59] and [60]), and (3) it was occupied on only two occasions during a 10-year marriage (JAF v JAE [2016] 3 SLR(R) 717 at [15]).

(iii) At this juncture, it bears noting that while the length of stay at the property is relevant in determining whether it is a matrimonial asset – this is not a decisive factor. ¹⁴ What is more important is whether the property had been used as a matrimonial home – or, to put it more elegantly, as the “cradle of the family”: Chen Siew Hwee v Low Kee Guan [2006] 4 SLR(R) 605 at [33]. If the answer is yes, then the property is a matrimonial asset. For examples, see, e.g., (1) CXR v CXQ [2023] SGHCF 10 (“CXR”) (property was used as a matrimonial home for 21 months during a nine-year marriage), (2) VGR v VGS [2020] SGFC 27 (“VGR”) at [140] (property was used as a matrimonial home during the first one to two years of a 10-year marriage), (3) TND v TNC [2017] SGCA 34 at [36] (property was used as a matrimonial home for 15 months during a 13-year marriage), and (4) XGW v XGX [2025] SGFC 2 at [1], [2] and [21] (property was used as a matrimonial home for about two years during a five-year marriage). ¹⁵

18 Applying the above principles to the present facts, I find that the Beijing property is a “matrimonial asset” under s 112(10)(a)(i). Let me explain.

(a) The parties’ residence at the Beijing property is neither “casual” or “occasional”. They had resided there together for a total of about 16 months over two periods during their 8½ years of marriage.

(i) First period (Seven months). They began co-habiting in the Beijing property in October 2014 and continued to reside there together after their marriage in February 2015. (As stated in [17(b)], the period of their residence in the property before marriage can be considered under s 112(10)(a)(i).) The parties eventually left the property in May 2015 when the Husband began working in Singapore.

(ii) Second period (Nine months). The Husband subsequently found work in Beijing. When he returned there in May 2017, he resided at the Beijing property. The Wife stayed with him at the property in June 2017 and from January to August 2018. ¹⁶

(b) The Beijing property had served as the parties’ matrimonial home at the start of the marriage. They would probably have continued to live there but for the fact that the Husband had found a job in Singapore in 2015. When the Husband returned to Beijing to work, the property once again served as the parties’ matrimonial home. The property would have continued to serve as their matrimonial home if not for the Husband’s decision to work in Singapore in 2018.

19 Having determined that the Beijing property is a matrimonial asset, the next step is to assess its value.

20 The parties’ submission on this are as follows:

21 I prefer to adopt the Husband’s valuation. First, it is based on an actual offer made for the Beijing property (in November 2024). Second, his valuation is more recent than the Wife’s, which is based on an appraisal report done 2½ years ago (in January 2023).

22 In valuing the Beijing property, I agree with the Wife that it is appropriate to deduct its outstanding mortgage loan. ¹⁹ I assess this loan to be RMB393,381.27. ²⁰ After deducting the outstanding mortgage loan from RMB2.1M, the value of the Beijing property is RMB1,706,618.73 ($318,994.16). ²¹

23 I now turn to the next disputed asset – the Husband’s bonus of about $500,000 in 2021 (“Bonus”).

24 The Wife contended that the Husband had failed to account for the Bonus. ²² This contention had been “vehemently denied”. According to the Husband, he had voluntarily disclosed the records for the relevant accounts, and that these records show the following. ²³

25 The Wife submitted that the records do not support the Husband’s evidence in [24(d)] – that the Bonus was transferred to the Moomoo account. ²⁴

(a) First, the records of DBS account 288XXX show that funds totalling USD365,000 ($493,261) ²⁵ were transferred to an account bearing number “072XXX255” as follows:

The Wife highlighted that (1) the account “072XXX255” does not match Moomoo’s account no. 100XXX, and (2) there is no evidence to show that “072XXX255” is linked to the Moomoo account.

(b) Second, the Husband had failed to produce the Moomoo transaction records from September to November 2022.

26 The Husband’s response to the discrepancies in the account numbers (i.e., 072XXX255 v 100XXX) is as follows.

(a) First, the Wife had failed to raise this issue in her requests for discovery. As such, he had been unfairly deprived of an opportunity to respond to her submission in his affidavits.

(b) Second, and in any event, the discrepancies in the account numbers are due to Moomoo’s system enhancement in 2022. The Husband referred me to the following email from Moomoo in June 2023: ²⁶

... Moomoo Financial Singapore Pte Ltd underwent system enhancement in Q4 2022. ... The purpose of the enhancement was to assimilate the accounts such as HK Margin Account, US Margin Account, and CN Margin Account (which is under previous account structure) into Universal Account (Main Account). ...

We hereby confirm that your account details are as below after the completion of the system enhancement.

(c) Finally, the contemporaneous records show that the following funds – which match those in [25(a)] above – were deposited into the Moomoo accounts in September 2021:

27 The issue before me is essentially this – Has the Husband sufficiently addressed the discrepancies in the account numbers (i.e., 072XXX255 v 100XXX). To address this issue, I will need to consider whether it is possible that the records in [25(a)] and [26(c)] above relate to the same transactions – even though the account numbers are different.

28 I accept the Husband’s explanation at [24(d)] above that the Bonus had been deposited into the Moomoo account.

(a) In my view, it is improbable that the deposits in [25(a)] and [26(c)] above – which involve the same date and the same amount – can relate to different transactions.

(b) This is especially so given that the amounts involved are huge. If the deposits in [25(a)] and [26(c)] above did in fact relate to different transactions, this would mean that on top of the Bonus, the Husband had deposited another USD 365,000 ($500,000) from 2 to 8 September 2021. Given the Husband’s income (see [60(c)] below), it is improbable that he had such monies.

29 To sum up, the matrimonial assets liable for division are as follows:

30 Having determined the total value of the matrimonial assets, the next step is to divide them in a “just and equitable” way.

31 The parties have a dual-income marriage. ³⁵ For such marriages, courts have typically applied the “structured approach” to dividing the matrimonial assets. Under this approach, a court considers two factors when making a division. First, the parties’ direct financial contributions towards “the acquisition or improvement of matrimonial assets”. Second, the parties’ “indirect contributions to the well-being of the family”. Thereafter, courts will divide the matrimonial assets between the parties base on their respective contributions to the matrimonial partnership: ANJ v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043 at [22] and [26]; TNL v TNK [2017] 1 SLR 609 at [42], [44], [46] and [47].

32 The parties’ submissions of their respective contributions to the matrimonial partnership are as follows:

(a) The Husband’s submissions: ³⁶

(b) The Wife submissions: ³⁷

33 I begin by assessing the parties’ direct financial contributions.

34 I proceed on the basis that funds for assets held in a party’s sole name would have come from that party.

35 Under this approach, I will only need to assess the extent of direct financial contributions by each party for those assets held in joint names. There are two such assets in the present case: (1) the UOB One Account 374 XXX (“UOB One Account”) and (2) the matrimonial home: see [4(a)] above.

(a) UOB One Account – The Husband had requested that the funds in this account ($638.35) be attributed to him solely as (i) he was the sole party who had contributed to the account and (ii) the Wife did not deny this. I see no issue with acceding to this request.

(b) Matrimonial home – The Husband had submitted that the parties’ direct financial contributions are as follows: $516,331.88 (Husband) and $43,944.38 (Wife). ³⁸ Having considered the Husband’s computations of the payments made, I find his submission to be reasonable.

36 Accordingly, the parties’ direct financial contributions are as follows:

37 I now come to the parties’ indirect contributions to “the well-being of the family”. The factors that courts typically consider for such contributions have been discussed in XDZ at [29(b)]. These factors include the extent to which each party (a) had paid the household expenses, (b) had performed the household chores, (c) had cared for the child(ren) and other family members, (d) had expended money and effort to maintain/enhance the condition of the matrimonial home, (e) had expended money and effort to enhance the quality of life of family members, (f) had made personal sacrifices for the family, and (g) had supported the other party.

38 Using the above factors, I find that the parties’ indirect contributions relative to each other are as follows:

39 Looking at all the factors wholistically, I find that the Wife’s indirect contributions are higher than the Husband’s, and that their relative contributions are as follows: 40% (Husband) – 60% (Wife).

40 Considering both the parties’ direct and indirect contributions, I find that the matrimonial assets should be divided in the ratio of 63.5 (Husband) – 36.5 (Wife).

41 Based on the ratio in [40] above, the matrimonial assets are to be divided between the parties as follows:

42 On the basis that the matrimonial assets in sole name and the UOB One Account ⁵⁷ will be held by the relevant parties, their respective shares in the matrimonial home will be as follows:

43 By the time of the hearing before me, the parties have already made the following arrangements regarding the sale proceeds of the matrimonial home: ⁶²

44 At this juncture, I digress to note that based on the figures provided by the parties, it appears that there is a discrepancy of $13,200 in the value of the sale proceeds of the matrimonial home: compare [43(d)] and with [4(a)(1)]. When considered against the total value of the matrimonial assets ($1,446,522.98), ⁶³ I find that this discrepancy is not significant.

45 To recap – the Wife is entitled to $410,521.99 from the sale proceeds of the matrimonial home: [42(c)] above. She has already received a sum of $150,000 of these proceeds: [43(b)] above. This means that the Wife should receive a further sum of $260,521.99 from the sale proceeds of the matrimonial home (i.e., $410,521.99 minus $150,000). In the circumstances, I order that the Wife is to receive this sum of $260,521.99 as follows:

46 Before moving to the next issue, I wish to briefly address the Wife’s suspicion that the Husband had concealed assets estimated at about $600,000. She came to this suspicion based on the following:

(a) First, she speculated that the Husband’s monthly savings are approximately $4,000 to $5,000, amounting to SGD 60,000 annually. Extrapolating from this, he would have saved about $360,000 in the six years between 2018 to 2023.

(b) Second, the Husband’s actual savings could even be higher given that (i) the costs of living in Beijing are lower than those in Singapore and (ii) he had received bonuses estimated at $20,000 in 2020, $510,000 in 2021, and $30,000 in 2022. ⁶⁴

Given the above, the Wife submitted I ought to include half of the alleged concealed assets (i.e., about $300,000) into the matrimonial pool for division.

47 I am unable to accept the Wife’s submission.

(a) First, her claims that the Husband had hidden wealth and undisclosed bonuses are based on conjecture.

(b) Second, the Wife’s submission that the Husband has monthly savings of $4,000 to $5,000 for the past six years is premised on the Husband drawing an income of $13,333/month since 2018. She had failed to prove that he had been earning such an income for the past six years.

(c) Third, the Wife’s claims that the Husband has substantial savings ignores the fact that he had to pay tax on his earnings. (For instance, he had paid $112,714.25 in taxes in 2022. ⁶⁵ ) Additionally, these claims contradict her own submissions that the family had been leading a very comfortable lifestyle principally financed by the Husband. See, for instance, the following submissions from the Wife: ⁶⁶

In relation to standard of living, the child has enjoyed an elevated standard of living, with the parties travelling frequently with at least 8 international trips per year were recorded, with most expenses covered by the Husband until recently. This supports an inference that the parties maintained a relatively high standard of living during the marriage.

[emphasis added]

(d) Finally, regarding the Wife’s submission that the costs of living in Beijing is lower than Singapore, it bears highlighting that the Husband had worked there for only a relatively brief period – between May 2017 and August 2018 – and not throughout the duration of the marriage.

48 I will now turn to issues regarding the custody, care and control of the son. He is currently about five years old and has been “diagnosed clinically with autism spectrum disorder”. ⁶⁷ (emphasis added)

49 The parties have submitted for the following orders to be made regarding the son:

50 Before addressing the parties’ submission, it is useful to first set out the applicable principles.

(a) Shared care and control arrangements. The relevant considerations have been discussed in detail in XLS v XLT [2025] SGFC 49 (“XLS”) at [8] and [9]. They include the following: (i) Whether there is allegation of family violence against the child by the parent(s); (ii) Whether both parents are equally committed to care for the child; (iii) Whether the parents are equally able to care for the child; (iv) Whether the parents can cooperate within an arrangement of shared care and control; (v) Whether there has been attempts to alienate the child; and (vi) Whether a shared care and control arrangement is likely to harm the child.

(b) Sole care and control arrangements. The relevant considerations have been discussed in detail in XDZ v XEA [2024] SGFC 90 (“XDZ”) at [14] to [16]. They include the following: (i) The parents’ past and present interactions with the child; (ii) The parents’ future caregiving arrangements; (iii) Adverse considerations.

51 Taking reference from the relevant considerations set out in [50] above, my findings are as follows.

52 Having considered the relevant factors wholistically, I find that a shared care and control arrangement is suitable for the son.

53 The Husband had proposed how the son’s care and control could be shared between the parties. ⁹⁸ The Wife did not show that this proposal is unworkable. I find the proposal to be reasonable and made the terms of the shared care and control order accordingly.

54 I now come to the issue of the son’s maintenance.

55 I begin by assessing how much is required to maintain the son each month. On this issue, the parties’ estimate, as well as my finding, on his monthly expenses are as follows:

56 It is evident from the above that my finding regarding the son’s monthly expenses is closer to the Husband’s than the Wife’s. I take this opportunity to make some observations.

(a) I found the Wife’s estimate to be excessive. For instance, she had estimated that the son needs $1,000/month (about $30/day) for food and groceries. It bears highlighting that the child is only about five years old.

(b) It is incumbent on the Wife to provide sufficient evidence to support her case that $5,565/month is needed to maintain the son. She has failed to prove this.

(c) Instead, she sought to justify her high estimates by submitting that the Husband earns a high income. ¹⁰⁰ I find this submission wholly unmeritorious. It ignores the fact that the Husband’s expenses post-divorce will increase with the need for him to set up his own household.

57 Having determined the son’s monthly expenses, the next issue is how the parties should share these expenses. Their submissions on this issue are as follows:

58 Based on the Husband’s submission, the parties’ contributions towards the son’s maintenance are as follows:

59 I accept the Husband’s submission. These are my reasons.

60 Courts must “have regard to all the circumstances of the case” when ordering child maintenance in divorce cases: s 69(4) read with s 127 of the Charter. This includes considering whether there is a significant disparity in the financial positions between the parties, and if so, whether one of them will suffer hardship if he/she is made to contribute equally to the child’s expenses.

(a) If there is no such disparity, then courts have ordered the parties (i) to bear the child’s expenses equally, and (ii) to bear the costs for the child’s living expenses when he/she is in the party’s respective care. See e.g., CXR at [2], [117] and [119]; VFS v VFT [2020] SGFC 15 at [36]; VLE v VLF [2020] SGFC 74 at [54] to [56].

(b) However, if there is a significant disparity and one of them will suffer hardship, then courts have the power to – and should – mitigate such hardship. In this regard, courts have ordered the party who is much better off financially to bear more of the child’s expenses. Here are some examples:

61 In the present case, I note the following:

(a) The Husband has a significantly higher income than the Wife. See the following: ¹⁰³

(b) The Wife will suffer a significant deficit if she is made to bear half of the son’s monthly expenses.

(c) It is unfair to expect the Wife to bear this hardship for the reasons set out in [66(b)] below.

62 To avoid hardship to the Wife, I order that –

(a) The parties are to bear the costs for the son’s living expenses when the child is in their respective care. This is currently estimated at about $260/month per party. ¹⁰⁸

(b) The Husband is to bear the rest of the son’s monthly expenses. This is currently estimated at about $2,055. ¹⁰⁹ .

63 Finally, I come to the issue of spousal maintenance. The parties’ position on this are as follows.

64 Under s 113(1) of the Charter, a man may be ordered to pay maintenance to his former wife. Such maintenance is ordered to serve the following purposes.

(a) First, to mitigate the financial impact of a divorce on a former wife: see s 114(2) of the Charter. This is further discussed in [67] to [69] below.

(b) Second, to even out any financial inequalities between the parties which may exist after the division of matrimonial assets. Such inequalities may have arisen because of economic prejudice suffered by the former wife during the marriage: Tan Sue-Ann Melissa v Lim Siang Bok Dennis [2004] 3 SLR(R) 376 at [27]. Thus, it has been held that the power to order maintenance for a former wife is “supplementary to the power to divide matrimonial assets”: BG v BF [2007] 3 SLR(R) 233 at [75]; UYD v UYE [2019] SGHCF 20 (“UYD”) at [64].

65 As an aside, the purpose of spousal maintenance post-divorce may be contrasted with that of spousal maintenance pre-divorce. The purpose of the latter is to help a wife meet her financial needs where a husband has neglected or refused to provide reasonable maintenance for her: see s 69(1) of the Charter; Foo Ah Yan v Chiam Heng Chow [2012] 2 SLR 506 at [22]; XFJ v XFK [2024] SGFC 102 at [4] and [5].

66 In my view, it is appropriate to order the Husband to pay spousal maintenance.

(a) First, the Wife is likely to need financial assistance to weather the transitions brought about by the divorce. Among others, she will need to pay rent for a new home with the son. She estimated the rent to be about $2,000/month to $2,500/month. ¹¹² If the Wife were to pay the rent from her income ($3,009/month), she will go into a significant deficit every month.

(b) Second, it is unfair to expect the Wife to dip into her share of the matrimonial assets to cover the deficits given the following.

(i) The Husband is in a much better financial position than the Wife and he can easily cover her deficits.

(ii) The Wife had made significant contributions to the family during the marriage: see [38] above; s 114(2)(f) of the Charter.

(iii) The Wife had suffered economic prejudice as a result of her sacrifices for the family. To support the Husband’s career, she had given up her own career in China to follow him to Singapore. The Husband accepted that despite having a master’s degree from China, the Wife had found it difficult to get a job here based on her qualifications. The situation became so untenable that she had to undertake a course lasting for a few months to improve her job prospects in Singapore. ¹¹⁷ Further, the Wife had to relocate from Singapore to China, and then back to Singapore again, so that the Husband could seek better career opportunities. During the marriage, the Wife had also stopped work for about 18 months to care for the son. Such a lengthy period of unemployment would surely have an impact on her career. To be clear, in deciding to order spousal maintenance for the Wife, I am mindful that such maintenance is not intended to compensate her for loss of employment or for income that she might have had the opportunity to earn: VJM v VJL [2021] 5 SLR 1233 at [43] and [44].

67 Having determined that it is appropriate to order spousal maintenance, the next issue is how much should be the amount in the present case. On this issue, s 114(2) of the Charter directs that if a court decides to order maintenance under s 113(1), then –

... the court is to endeavour to place the parties, so far as it is practicable and, having regard to their conduct, just to do so, in the financial position in which they would have been if the marriage had not broken down and each had properly discharged his or her financial obligations and responsibilities towards the other.

[emphasis added]

68 The overarching principle embodied in s 114(2) is that of financial preservation: ATE v ATD [2016] SGCA 2 at [31]. In my view, one way of achieving the objective in s 114(2) is to consider (a) what additional expenses a former wife would have to bear on her own, and (b) what income she would lose, as a direct result of the divorce. After considering these matters, a court will be in a better position to determine the amount of financial relief needed to help a former wife weather the transitions brought about by the divorce.

69 It bears highlighting that when determining the quantum of the maintenance to order, a court is not required to ensure that a former wife is put in the same financial position as she was pre-divorce. Instead, a court is simply required to “endeavour” to minimise the financial disruption to her in “so far as it is practicable”. In this regard, s 114(1) stipulates that –

(a) the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

(b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

(c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage;

(d) the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage;

(e) any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage;

(f) the contributions made by each of the parties to the marriage to the welfare of the family, including any contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the family; and

(g) in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to either of the parties to the marriage of any benefit (for example, a pension) which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage that party will lose the chance of acquiring.

70 Applying these principles to the present case, I make the following findings:

(a) The maintenance sought by the Wife is unreasonable. First, she had failed to prove that if the marriage had not broken down, the Husband would have ordinarily paid for her expenses at $7,580/month. Second, I find that a number of the expenses that she had claimed for – e.g., transport (at $1,000/month), clothing (at $200/month), accessories (at $300/month), and holiday (at $1,000/month) – is excessive. ¹¹⁸ Finally, I fail to understand why she is unable to pay for her personal expenses given that her income is $3,009/month: s 114(1)(a).

(b) With the divorce, the Wife will have to incur rental expenses: s 114(1)(b). She would not need to bear such expenses “if the marriage had not broken down”. Accordingly, I find it appropriate for the Husband to pay the Wife $2,500/month as financial relief to help cover her likely monthly deficits. ¹¹⁹

71 The next question is for how long the maintenance should last.

72 The Husband had submitted that the maintenance be limited to only six months. I am unable to accept the Husband’s submission.

(a) The period of maintenance proposed by the Husband is sufficient to cover the Wife’s rental expenses for only half a year. Her income is unlikely to increase by $2,500 in that time. After this period, is she supposed to dip into her share of the matrimonial assets to cover the deficits?

(b) Further, a short multiplier (such as six months) is generally ordered where there is a need to tide a former wife over for a short period to meet her immediate financial needs. One example is UYD. In that case, the High Court had ordered the man to pay his former wife six months’ maintenance to tide her over until he transferred $384,006.27 (of matrimonial funds) to her. Pursuant to the divorce, she had received four properties worth more than $15M. One of them was for her residence, and she could receive rental income from the other three properties as a substitute for maintenance: UYD at [65] to [67].

73 In my view, the period of maintenance should give the Wife sufficient time to adapt to her new circumstances post-divorce and to stabilise her finances. In this regard, applying s 114(1), I note the following.

(a) First, the Wife has a take-home income of about $3,009/month.

(b) Second, she has the capacity to earn more income because she (i) is relatively young (about 38 years old), ¹²⁰ and (ii) has a master’s degree in sports science and a Master of Arts’ degree in teaching Chinese as an international language.

(c) Third, the marriage is about 8½ years. The duration of the marriage is important to ensure that the period of maintenance is not excessive. See e.g., ACY v ACZ [2014] 2 SLR 1320 at [55] where the High Court rejected a prayer for a multiplier of three years of maintenance as being excessive when the marriage had lasted for only three years.

74 Considering the factors wholistically, I find that a multiplier of four years of maintenance is reasonable. Such a multiplier is consistent with the following precedents:

75 I have the discretion to order that the spousal maintenance be paid either in lump sum or in monthly instalments: s 115(1) of the Charter.

76 If paid in lump sum, the spousal maintenance will come to $120,000 – i.e., $2,500/month x 48 months. The Husband does not have sufficient cash to pay this amount, and he will need to liquid some of his investments: see [4(b)] above. In my view, this is not ideal.

77 In the circumstances, I order that the maintenance is to be paid monthly. The Husband will be able to afford to make such payments:

78 Accordingly, I order that the Husband is to pay $2,500/month for a period of four years as spousal maintenance.

79 The orders that I have made are set out in Annex B.

80 If the parties wish to make costs submissions, they are to inform the court within two weeks of the date of this judgement.

   

1 The matrimonial assets of the Plaintiff and the Defendant (“Parties”) shall be divided in the ratio of 63.5% (Plaintiff) – 36.5% (Defendant).

2 The abovementioned division shall be implemented as follows:

(a) Each Party shall retain the assets in their sole names.

(b) The Plaintiff shall retain the funds in UOB One Account 374 XXX.

(c) The sale proceeds of the matrimonial home at No. 28 XXX shall be dealt with as follows:

3 The transfers in [2(c)] shall be executed on or before one month from the date of this Order.

4 There shall be no further claims against Parties and/or their assets.

5 The Parties shall have joint custody of the son (D.O.B. XX February 2020).

6 The Parties shall have shared care and control of the son based on the following arrangements.

(a) Residence. The son shall reside with the Parties as follows:

(b) Taking Over. The Party taking over the care of the son shall do so at either his school or the residence of the Party handing over the son, whichever is applicable.

(c) Remote Access. On days when a Party does not have physical time with the son, both Parties shall facilitate liberal remote access by way of phone/video calls with him, so long as it does not interfere with the son’s schedule and routine. There should not be any physical or time limitations imposed by one Party should the son wish to speak to the other Party over a phone/video call. During these calls, the other Party shall not interfere.

(d) Public Holiday Arrangements. Parties shall have the son on alternate public holidays from 9:00 am to 8:00 pm, save for the Chinese New Year (“CNY”) holidays. For the avoidance of doubt, this clause shall not apply to any public holiday that occurs during the son’s school holidays. These arrangements shall begin with the Plaintiff having time with the son on the first public holiday following the date of this Order.

(e) CNY Holiday Arrangements. For the CNY holidays, the arrangements are as follows:

(f) School Holiday Arrangements. When the son commences primary school education, all his school holidays shall be split equally between the Parties. In the event of disagreement –

(i) The Plaintiff shall be given the first half of the school holidays in even years and the second half of the school holidays in odd years.

(ii) The Defendant shall have the second half of the school holidays in even years and the first half of the school holidays in odd years.

(g) Overseas Travels. Either Party may take the son overseas, subject to that Party giving prior notification to the other Party and providing information about the trip (e.g., contact, flight and accommodation details). Such notification and information shall be given at least one (1) month prior to the date of departure.

(i) Prior to the son commencing primary school education, the Parties may bring him overseas for up to two (2) weeks, once every six (6) months.

(ii) When the son commences primary school education, the Parties may bring him overseas during their respective school holidays with him.

(h) Birth Certificate and Other Documents. The following arrangements shall apply:

(i) The Plaintiff shall be the custodian of the son’s passport.

(ii) The Defendant shall be the custodian of the son’s birth certificate and medical records.

(iii) Parties may request for the above documents from the other Party with reasons provided. The requested documents shall be returned to the original party promptly.

(iv) The son’s passport shall be released to the Defendant at least three (3) days before the son’s intended travels. The passport shall be returned to the Plaintiff within (3) days of the son’s return to Singapore.

(i) Others. For the avoidance of doubt –

(i)  If that there is any inconsistency in the care arrangements:

(1)  The School Holidays Arrangements shall take precedence above all other care arrangements.

(2) The CNY Holiday Arrangements and Public Holiday Arrangements shall take precedence over the regular care arrangements.

(ii)  The Plaintiff may bring the son to and from his early intervention centre if the Defendant is unable to bring/fetch him herself during the period when he is in her care, and vice versa.

(iii)  If the Parties are invited to participate in the son’s school events (e.g. field trips, special events, celebrations, performances), both Parties shall be allowed to attend these events if the school permits. Otherwise, the Parties shall alternate these school events between themselves. If one Party is unable to attend the school event, he or she shall inform the other Party and permit the other Party to attend in his or her place.

(iv)  Neither Party shall disparage the other Party to the son or in his presence.

(v) Parties shall continue to attend counselling to assist them in co-parenting at Strengthening Families Programme@Family Service Centre (FAM@FSC) (Lakeside Family Service).

7 Parties may depart from the arrangements in [6] above by mutual agreement.

8 The Parties’ obligation towards the son’s maintenance shall be as follows.

(a) The Parties are to bear the costs for the son’s living expenses when the child is in their respective care.

(b) The Plaintiff is to bear the rest of the son’s monthly expenses.

9 The Plaintiff shall pay $2,500/month for a period of four years towards the Defendant’s maintenance.

10 The payments in [9] –

(a) Shall be paid into a bank account to be designated by the Defendant,

(b) Shall be paid on or before the last day of each month, and

(c) Shall begin in July 2025.

11 Liberty to apply.

Date: 9 June 2025