THE LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE v EZEKIEL PETER LATIMER
14 cases cited
(12 SG, 2 foreign)
Catchwords
Practice Areas
Counsel (4)
Case Significance
Law Society of Singapore v Ezekiel Peter Latimer [2024] SGHC 90 was a Grounds of Decision of the Court of Three Judges of Singapore delivered on 28 March 2024, with Sundaresh Menon CJ delivering the grounds of decision of the court, sitting with Tay Yong Kwang JCA and Woo Bih Li JAD, in Originating Application No 7 of 2023, following a hearing on 24 January 2024. The disciplinary proceedings were commenced against the respondent, Mr Ezekiel Peter Latimer, in respect of alleged misconduct while acting for Mr Chung Fook Keong Melvin and Ms Doan Thi Thanh Thuy (collectively, "the Complainants") in the period from 2016 to 2019. The acts and omissions complained of pertained to two sets of events: the respondent's involvement in Ms Thuy's appointment as a director of a company and the events which followed ("the first matter"), and his management of the Complainants' lawsuit in MC/MC 16562/2017 ("the second matter"). The Law Society of Singapore, the applicant, preferred two charges in relation to each matter, including, in relation to the first matter, a charge of failing to disclose to Ms Thuy information that would reasonably affect her interests, in particular that the company was involved in significant ongoing litigation. The catchwords frame the issues around a solicitor's duties to a client, conflict of interest, a solicitor's undertaking, and breach of professional conduct. The applicant was represented by Braddell Brothers LLP, with the judgment referencing the Interpretation Act and the Legal Profession Act.
Summary
SUPREME COURT OF SINGAPORE
28 March 2024
Case summary
Law Society of Singapore v Ezekiel Peter Latimer [2024] SGHC 90
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Decision of the Court of Three Judges (delivered by Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon):
Outcome: C3J struck a solicitor off the roll as he was found to possess a clear defect of character rendering him unfit to be a member of the legal profession.
Pertinent and significant points of the judgment
• Solicitors would be well-advised to avoid giving an undertaking in relation to matters beyond their control. If they do provide such an undertaking, such as one pertaining to a third party’s conduct, they do so at their own peril. All eventualities which might affect a solicitor’s ability to perform an undertaking should therefore be carefully considered prior to giving it: at [33].
Background
1 Mr Ezekiel Peter Latimer (“the Respondent”) was a solicitor with over 20 years of experience.
2 The relevant facts pertain to two matters. The first relates to the Respondent’s involvement in the appointment of his former client, Ms Doan Thi Thanh Thuy (“Ms Thuy”), as a director of a company (“the Company”) and the events which followed (“the first matter”). The second involves his management of a lawsuit brought by Ms Thuy and her husband, Mr Chung Fook Keong Melvin, (collectively, “the Complainants”) in MC/MC 16562/2017 (“MC 16562”) (“the second matter”).
3 In relation to the first matter, the Respondent asked Ms Thuy in 2016 whether she would be interested in becoming a director of the Company. He informed her that the Company was dormant and that she would not need to do anything in relation to the Company’s affairs. In response to her queries on the risks and responsibilities of becoming a director, the Respondent had assured Ms Thuy she would not face any liability as long as she did not sign any personal guarantee. Ms Thuy agreed and was appointed a director of the Company.
4 The Company was not in fact dormant. Further, the Company was party to an ongoing suit (“Suit 1248”) that had been brought by a Malaysian-registered company (“HPL”), to recover a debt of US$1.6m. The Respondent allegedly did not inform Ms Thuy of (a) the state of the Company’s indebtedness owed to HPL, and (b) the existence of Suit 1248, much less that it was ongoing at the time she agreed to become a director. This was even though the Respondent was aware of Suit 1248 and had seen no documentary proof that it had been settled.
5 HPL obtained final judgment and filed an application against the Company for examination of the judgment debtor (“EJD”). In the EJD proceedings, the court made orders for Ms Thuy to attend court and to be examined on the Company’s debts. However, Ms Thuy, who it appears was unaware of the judgment against the Company and the EJD proceedings, failed to respond. The Respondent, who was appointed to act for the Company in Suit 1248, knew of these proceedings but apparently failed to inform Ms Thuy of them. HPL eventually commenced committal proceedings against Ms Thuy.
6 At the hearing of the committal proceedings, both Ms Thuy and the Respondent were absent. A warrant of arrest was thus issued against Ms Thuy. Ms Thuy claimed that she did not know about the orders made against her or that her attendance at the EJD proceedings was required until the warrant was issued. She was subsequently found guilty of contempt and ordered to pay a $25,000 fine, failing which she would be committed to prison for 14 days. Ms Thuy’s passport was also to be handed to the court to be impounded until the fine was paid. Ms Thuy was particularly troubled about surrendering her passport, as she needed to return to Vietnam for personal reasons. The Respondent assured her that he would assist in obtaining the release of her passport.
7 An appeal was then filed by the Respondent on Ms Thuy’s behalf against the order. Pending the appeal, the Respondent sought permission for Ms Thuy’s passport to be returned temporarily and for her to travel to Vietnam for up to 30 days. The application was granted on condition that a surety be provided to secure Ms Thuy’s return to Singapore after 30 days. The Respondent then gave a personal undertaking to the court, under which he agreed to stand as surety for the sum of $25,000 in order to secure the release of Ms Thuy’s passport (“the Personal Undertaking”).
8 In relation to the second matter, the Respondent was engaged in 2017 by the Complainants to commence MC 16562 against two individuals (“the Defendants”) for the repayment of loans which the Complainants had allegedly extended to them. In those proceedings, the Defendants’ solicitors requested copies of documents from the Complainants.
9 These requests were not acceded to, apparently because the Respondent had failed to convey them to the Complainants, and this culminated in an application by the Defendants on 26 April 2018 for specific discovery. The court issued an order on 30 April 2018 directing that unless the Complainants produced the relevant documents by 3 May 2018, their claims would be dismissed (“the Unless Order”).
10 Despite being aware of the Unless Order, the Respondent did not inform the Complainants of it. He also failed to arrange for the Complainants to depose the required affidavit. Instead, he filed a solicitor’s affidavit on 3 May 2018 in purported compliance with the order. The court found that this did not comply with the order and that the Complainants were accordingly in breach. MC 16562 was therefore dismissed and the Complainants were ordered to pay the Defendants the costs of the suit.
11 The Respondent then filed two applications – a notice of appeal against the court’s dismissal of MC 16562 (which was apparently filed out of time) and an application for an extension of time to file another notice of appeal – only to withdraw both subsequently. This resulted in further costs orders against the Complainants. As a result, a Writ of Seizure and Sale (“WSS”) was filed by the Defendants to enforce the costs orders, and this was duly executed when various assets belonging to the Complainants were seized at their property in October 2018. According to the Complainants, this was the first time that they learnt of the adverse costs orders or the execution proceedings.
12 Following a complaint by the Complainants, the Law Society of Singapore (“the Applicant”) brought four charges against the Respondent before a disciplinary tribunal (the “DT”). Two charges related to the first matter: (a) a charge of failing to disclose to Ms Thuy information which would reasonably affect her interests (in particular, that the Company was involved in significant ongoing litigation) (“First Charge”) and (b) a charge of failing to withdraw from representing Ms Thuy despite a reasonable expectation of a conflict between her interests and his own, which allegedly arose when the Respondent provided the Personal Undertaking (“Second Charge”). Another two charges related to the second matter: (a) a charge of failing to act with reasonable diligence and competence in MC 16562 (“Third Charge”) and (b) a charge of failing to keep the Complainants reasonably informed of the progress of MC 16562 (“Fourth Charge”). The DT found that all four charges were made out and that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action existed.
13 The Applicant then applied for the Respondent to be sanctioned under s 83(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed). It argued that due cause for disciplinary action had been made out, and that the appropriate sanction was for the Respondent to be struck off the Roll of Advocates and Solicitors. The Respondent did not file an affidavit in response to the application but filed written submissions two days before the hearing which set out some factors he believed were mitigating. He asked the court to impose a suspension term instead.
Decision
There was due cause for disciplinary action
14 The Second Charge was not made out as no potential conflict of interest arose from the provision of the Personal Undertaking. If exigencies compelled Ms Thuy to remain in Vietnam beyond 30 days, her interests would be furthered by seeking a deferment for her return and for the surrender of her passport. As the Respondent’s financial stake would only be engaged upon a breach of the conditions imposed for the release of Ms Thuy’s passport, it would have been in his interests to assist her in obtaining the deferment. Arguments that the Respondent might not have applied himself sufficiently to securing such a variation were speculative and had nothing to do with any question of a conflict of interest: at [29] to [30].
15 However, the Respondent’s provision of the Personal Undertaking was unwise as he did not discuss the relevant implications with Ms Thuy. Given the weighty implications which accompany the provision of a solicitor’s undertaking, solicitors would be well-advised to avoid giving an undertaking for matters beyond their control. All eventualities which might affect the solicitor’s ability to perform the undertaking should be carefully considered prior to giving it. Should a solicitor choose to provide an undertaking regarding matters outside his or her control, such as an undertaking pertaining to a third party’s conduct, this is done at his or her own peril: at [31] to [33].
16 Due cause for sanction existed in relation to the First Charge. The Respondent was in breach of his duty of honesty, competence and diligence under r 5(2)(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (“LPPCR”) as he provided Ms Thuy with false information that the Company was dormant and withheld material information in relation to its involvement in ongoing litigation. The severity of the Respondent’s conduct was also exacerbated by the fact that Ms Thuy was a layperson who was neither legally trained nor well-versed in English: at [39] to [42].
17 Due cause for sanction existed in relation to the Third Charge. The Respondent was in breach of his duty under r 5(2)(c) of the LPPCR to act with reasonable diligence and competence in the provision of services to the Complainants. The Complainants were not notified of the Unless Order before the deadline for compliance. Further, the order was breached even though the relevant documents were in the Respondent’s possession at the material time. Hence, the breach was occasioned solely by the Respondent’s failure to take the requisite instructions and/or to act upon them: at [44] to [46].
18 Due cause for sanction existed in relation to the Fourth Charge. The Respondent was in breach of his duty under r 5(2)(e) of the LPPCR to keep the Complainants reasonably informed of the progress of MC 16562. The Respondent was unable to produce any written correspondence showing that he had updated the Complainants. His mishandling of the suit led to the dismissal of their claim, costs orders being made against them, and ultimately to their assets being seized pursuant to the WSS: at [50].
Sanction
19 The Respondent’s misconduct taken as a whole warranted a striking off. This is because it reflected a character defect rendering him unfit to be a member of the legal profession, even though it did not involve dishonesty: at [51], [53] to [54].
20 The nature of the Respondent’s misconduct fell somewhere between that of the solicitors in the cases of Ooi Oon Tat and Udeh Kumar: at [63].
21 In Ooi Oon Tat, the solicitor was engaged by his client at the assessment of damages stage. This was after the client had already obtained interlocutory judgment against his opponent. The solicitor failed to respond to multiple discovery requests made by the client’s opponent, which led to a breach of an unless order and the striking out of his client’s claim. By that time, the client’s claim had been time-barred. Three charges were brought against the solicitor. The court held that the solicitor’s conduct fell just shy of the threshold of disclosing a character defect rendering him unfit to be a member of the legal profession. Although the respondent’s misconduct spanned about six months and there was an antecedent of a one-year suspension, there was no finding of a persistent pattern of offensive conduct. A five-year suspension was imposed instead: at [56] to [57].
22 In Udeh Kumar, the solicitor faced 11 charges before the C3J, which fell within three broad categories: (a) a failure to use his best endeavours to avoid unnecessary adjournments, expense and wastage of the court’s time, (b) deceiving or misleading the court by making false and inaccurate statements, and (c) advising his client to obtain a medical certificate under false pretences. Considering the misconduct in totality, the court struck the respondent off the roll: at [61].
23 On the facts, the Respondent had demonstrated a sustained pattern of offensive conduct pointing to a character defect rendering him unfit to remain as an Advocate and Solicitor. Unlike the solicitor in Ooi Oon Tat, whose wrongdoing pertained to a single matter and spanned about six months, the Respondent’s misconduct with respect to the First, Third and Fourth Charges involved his failure to manage appropriately two distinct matters across a period of several years. He also had two antecedents whilst the solicitor in Ooi Oon Tat had previously been sanctioned once: at [63] to [64].
24 There were no circumstances which militated against the striking off of the Respondent. The Respondent’s contention that the breaches occurred at a time when he was overwhelmed by work was entirely without merit, as the onus lies on the solicitor to ensure that his schedule and workload (being matters wholly within his control) do not affect his ability to discharge his duties and responsibilities. His seniority as a legal practitioner was an additional aggravating factor: at [66].
25 Accordingly, the Court of Three Judges struck the Respondent off the roll: at [67].
This summary is provided to assist in the understanding of the Court’s grounds of decision. It is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the Court. All numbers in bold font and square brackets refer to the corresponding paragraph numbers in the Court’s grounds of decision.
What was Law Society of Singapore v Ezekiel Peter Latimer [2024] SGHC 90 about?
It was a Court of Three Judges disciplinary matter, with grounds delivered 28 March 2024 by Sundaresh Menon CJ, concerning alleged misconduct by solicitor Ezekiel Peter Latimer while acting for two complainants between 2016 and 2019, spanning a director appointment and management of a lawsuit.
What charges did the Law Society bring in [2024] SGHC 90?
The Law Society of Singapore preferred two charges in relation to each of two matters. In the first matter, one charge alleged that Ezekiel Peter Latimer failed to disclose to Ms Doan Thi Thanh Thuy information reasonably affecting her interests, in particular that the company was involved in significant ongoing litigation.
Who decided Law Society of Singapore v Ezekiel Peter Latimer [2024] SGHC 90?
The Court of Three Judges decided it in Originating Application No 7 of 2023. Sundaresh Menon CJ delivered the grounds of decision of the court, sitting with Tay Yong Kwang JCA and Woo Bih Li JAD, after a hearing on 24 January 2024.
Statutes Cited
Cases Cited (14)
SG (1)
SLR (11)
[1999] 1 SLR(R) 266 [2006] 2 SLR(R) 117 [2010] 3 SLR 390 [2012] 4 SLR 1232 [2017] 4 SLR 1369 [2019] 4 SLR 1427 [2020] 4 SLR 1171 [2022] 4 SLR 467 [2023] 3 SLR 1401 [2023] 3 SLR 966 [2023] 4 SLR 1760
UK (2)
[1988] 1 WLR 1051 [2005] EWHC 1830
Referenced in
Statutes interpreted in this judgment
Legal concepts & references
Judgment
Read the full judgment on the official Singapore Courts portal.
Read on eLitigationSource: eLitigation ([2024] SGHC 90)