SUPREME COURT OF SINGAPORE
[29 August 2024]
Case summary
GHI v Public Prosecutor [2024] SGHC 220
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Decision of the General Division of the High Court:
Outcome: General Division of the High Court upholds conviction and sentence of the appellant who was convicted in the District Court of aggravated outrage of modesty and sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment and a further two months’ imprisonment in lieu of caning.
Pertinent and significant points of the grounds of decision
• The practice of asking victims about their clothing at the time of the alleged offence is acceptable if this sheds light on how the offence was committed. However, the enquiry becomes objectionable when it is premised on, or leads to, the submission that the victim’s attire had in some way, invited the sexual assault. The court will not tolerate a line of inquiry regarding the victim’s attire when its implication is such that the victim invited the sexual assault: at [69] and [71].
• The purpose of cross-examination is not to cause unnecessary discomfort to, harass or abuse a witness. In cases of sexual offences especially, unwarranted questioning of the victim’s credibility, delving into irrelevant personal history or insinuating blame can not only re-traumatise the victim but also perpetuate harmful stereotypes about sexual violence. This approach can dissuade other victims from coming forward for fear of being subjected to a similar ordeal: at [73].
• Instead, the purpose of cross-examination is to elicit evidence. Cross-examination can and should be performed to elucidate the facts without resorting to intimidation or re-traumatisation of witnesses. It is possible to challenge the reliability and credibility of a witness in a way which is measured, respectful and prioritises the elicitation of the truth while preserving the dignity of all involved and upholding the decorum of the court: at [73] and [77].
• The giving of evidence can be re-traumatising for complainants of sexual offences. Special measures like shielding serve to mitigate the trauma that complainants of sexual assault often associate with the experience of giving live testimony in the same physical environment as the accused: at [80].
• The concept of shielding measures in legal proceedings brings to the fore complex questions about the balance between the presumption of innocence and the rights of the witness. Ultimately, the overriding aim is to ensure that justice is served whilst balancing the need to protect the witness and maintain the integrity of the judicial process, against the fundamental rights of the accused: at [88].
• If the court implements a shielding measure despite an objection, it should, in the interest of transparency, clearly explain its reason(s) for doing so. In this regard, it would be prudent for the court to: (a) highlight that it has a duty to navigate the complex intersection of ensuring a fair trial and protecting the rights of the accused on the one hand, whilst safeguarding the dignity, security and wellbeing of the victim/witness on the other; (b) underscore the fact that the shielding measure does not negate the accused’s presumption of innocence but rather seeks to address the power dynamics and potential for harm that can arise in the courtroom, especially in cases involving vulnerable witnesses; and (c) reassure parties that the determination of innocence or guilt will only be made after an assiduous assessment of the evidence presented at trial: at [88].
Background
1 The appellant operated and tutored at a tuition centre in Singapore. The then ten-year-old victim was a student at the tuition centre. On the day of the incident, the victim was the only student in the appellant’s lesson. During the lesson, the appellant allegedly: (a) used his hand to touch the victim’s right breast over her clothes; (b) placed his hand on her left thigh; (c) used his hand to touch her crotch area; and (d) kissed the back of her neck.
2 In the District Court, the appellant was convicted after trial of a single charge of aggravated outrage of modesty punishable under s 354(2) of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed). He was sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment, with a further two months’ imprisonment imposed in lieu of caning.
3 The appellant appealed against his conviction and sentence. His case on appeal against his conviction was, among other things, that the District Judge (“DJ”) had erred in finding that the victim was an unusually convincing witness. With respect to the sentence imposed, the appellant contended that the DJ had erred in finding that the degree of sexual exploitation in the present case was high and also in enhancing the imprisonment sentence in lieu of caning.
Decision
The appeal against conviction
4 The victim’s testimony was unusually convincing. None of the purported inconsistencies in the victim’s evidence diminished the credibility of the victim: at [23].
5 The DJ was entitled to make the finding and place weight on the fact that the victim had no ostensible reason to falsely implicate the appellant: at [45].
6 The fact that the victim’s dress tested negative for the appellant’s DNA did not assist either the Prosecution’s or the appellant’s case. On the present facts, it was possible that the appellant either did not touch the dress or that he did not leave sufficient DNA to be interpreted: at [49].
7 The environment at the time of the offence was not as “open” as portrayed by the appellant. In any event, the fact that the molest took place in potential sight of others was not a reason, on its own, to disbelieve the victim’s testimony: at [55] and [56].
8 The DJ was right to focus his scrutiny on the victim’s credibility, to first determine if there was a reasonable doubt within the Prosecution’s case. In the present case, there was no specific doubt that had arisen in the Prosecution’s case: at [58] and [59].
The appeal against sentence
9 This case fell into Band 2 of the sentencing framework in GBR v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2018] 3 SLR 1048, which corresponded to an imprisonment term of one to three years. In view of the other aggravating factors such as the appellant’s abuse of the trust reposed in him as a teacher and the victim’s age, the sentence of 14 months’ imprisonment could not be said to be manifestly excessive: at [65].
10 An enhancement of the imprisonment sentence in lieu of caning was necessary to achieve a sufficiently deterrent and retributive sentence. The two-month enhancement of the imprisonment sentence corresponded to the number of strokes of the cane avoided and was just and fair: at [67].
The giving of evidence by vulnerable witnesses
11 The practice of asking victims about their clothing at the time of the alleged offence was acceptable if this shed light on how the offence was committed. However, the enquiry became objectionable when it was premised on, or led to, the submission that the victim’s attire had in some way, invited the sexual assault. The court would not tolerate a line of inquiry regarding the victim’s attire when its implication was such that the victim invited the sexual assault: at [69] and [71].
12 While counsel’s comments to the victim, in the present case, could have been much better articulated, his questions to the victim did not cross the line insofar as he did not perpetuate the harmful stereotype that sexual assault was provoked by what the victim wore. The line of inquiry about the victim’s clothes at the material time was also relevant in view of the victim’s evidence on the manner in which the offence was committed and the DNA evidence relied upon by the Defence: at [71].
13 There was no prolonged cross-examination of the victim, which lasted half a day in the present case. The questions put to the victim were generally relevant and put in a measured way, and the victim was given the opportunity to clarify her answers at multiple points: at [72].
14 The purpose of cross-examination was not to cause unnecessary discomfort to, harass or abuse a witness. In cases of sexual offences especially, unwarranted questioning of the victim’s credibility, delving into irrelevant personal history or insinuating blame could not only re-traumatise the victim but also perpetuate harmful stereotypes about sexual violence. This approach could dissuade other victims from coming forward for fear of being subjected to a similar ordeal: at [73].
15 The purpose of cross-examination was to elicit evidence. Cross-examination could and should be performed to elucidate the facts without resorting to intimidation or re-traumatisation of witnesses. It was possible to challenge the reliability and credibility of a witness in a way which was measured, respectful and prioritised the elicitation of the truth while preserving the dignity of all involved and upholding the decorum of the court: at [73] and [77].
16 Under s 148 of the Evidence Act 1893 (“Evidence Act”), witnesses may be asked, during cross-examination, questions which tended to test a witness’ accuracy, veracity or credibility, discover the witness’ identity and position in life, or shake the witness’ credit by injuring his or her character. While cross-examination could be robust, appropriate cross-examination involved asking clear and purposeful questions that were relevant, and within legal limits. Questions should not be asked without reasonable grounds or be indecent or scandalous in nature, and speculative queries or irrelevant probing into the victim’s past were proscribed by law. Relevant provisions in this regard included ss 150, 151, 153 and 154 of the Evidence Act: at [74].
17 Section 154A(1) of the Evidence Act specifically provided that the questions that may be asked of an alleged victim of a sexual offence or child abuse offence were subject to restrictions as set out in r 3 of the Evidence (Restrictions on Questions and Evidence in Criminal Proceedings) Rules 2018. This provided that no question may be asked of the alleged victim, or evidence adduced, about the alleged victim’s sexual behaviour or physical appearance except with the permission of the court: at [75].
18 The Defence had objected to the Prosecution’s application for a shielding measure under s 281A of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010, submitting that a shielding measure implied that there had been “some sort of threat made to the victim… and [that] she [was] therefore frightened to see the [appellant] face-to-face”. However, an application for shielding measures did not necessarily imply that a threat was made to the victim: at [78] and [79].
19 The giving of evidence could be re-traumatising for complainants of sexual offences. Special measures like shielding served to mitigate the trauma that complainants of sexual assault often associated with the experience of giving live testimony in the same physical environment as the accused: at [80].
20 The concept of shielding measures in legal proceedings brought to the fore complex questions about the balance between the presumption of innocence and the rights of the witness. Ultimately, the overriding aim was to ensure that justice was served whilst balancing the need to protect the witness and maintain the integrity of the judicial process, against the fundamental rights of the accused: at [88].
21 If the court implemented a shielding measure despite an objection, it should, in the interest of transparency, clearly explain its reason(s) for doing so. In this regard, it would be prudent for the court to: (a) highlight that it had a duty to navigate the complex intersection of ensuring a fair trial and protecting the rights of the accused on the one hand, whilst safeguarding the dignity, security and wellbeing of the victim/witness on the other; (b) underscore the fact that the shielding measure did not negate the accused’s presumption of innocence but rather sought to address the power dynamics and potential for harm that could arise in the courtroom, especially in cases involving vulnerable witnesses; and (c) reassure parties that the determination of innocence or guilt would only be made after an assiduous assessment of the evidence presented at trial: at [88].
This summary is provided to assist in the understanding of the Court’s grounds of decision. It is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the Court. All numbers in bold font and square brackets refer to the corresponding paragraph numbers in the Court’s grounds of decision.