THE LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE v NEDUMARAN MUTHUKRISHNAN

[2024] SGHC 218 High Court (General Division) 29 August 2024 • C3J/OA 14/2023 • 28 min read

3 cases cited

Outcome

Acquitted

we acquitted the respondent on the Second and the Fourth Charges.

Source: [2024] SGHC 218, High Court (General Division), decided 29 August 2024. Read directly from the judgment.

Key facts

Court	High Court (General Division)
Decided	29 August 2024
Judges	Debbie Ong Siew Ling, Judith Prakash, Tay Yong Kwang
Charges / claim	Legal Profession
Outcome	Acquitted
Counsel	Pointer LLC, Teo Yi Hui

Source: [2024] SGHC 218, High Court (General Division), decided 29 August 2024 — eLitigation. Updated 25 June 2026.

Catchwords

Legal Profession — Disciplinary proceedings

Practice Areas

Legal Profession

Judges (3)

Debbie Ong Siew Ling Coram Judith Prakash Coram Tay Yong Kwang Delivered

Counsel (2)

Pointer LLC Firm Teo Yi Hui Counsel Applicant

Parties (2)

Law Society of Singapore Applicant Nedumaran Muthukrishnan Respondent

Case Significance

Law Society of Singapore v Nedumaran Muthukrishnan [2024] SGHC 218 was decided by a Court of 3 Supreme Court Judges, comprising Tay Yong Kwang JCA (delivering the grounds of decision of the court), Debbie Ong Siew Ling JAD and Judith Prakash SJ, heard on 4 July 2024 and decided on 29 August 2024, in Originating Application No 14 of 2023. The matter concerned disciplinary proceedings under the Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed). According to the grounds of decision, the respondent, Mr Nedumaran Muthukrishnan, was admitted as an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore on 25 May 1996 and faced four charges before a Disciplinary Tribunal constituted under s 90(1) of the Legal Profession Act, and he claimed trial to all four charges.

The first charge alleged that, in breach of Rule 5(2)(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, the respondent was not honest in his dealings with his client, Chan Yee Huat, in that between 17 March 2020 and 17 April 2020 he misled the client into believing that he had or would shortly be posting or hand-delivering cheques for payment of persons nominated by the client, in circumstances where he did not do so and had no intention of doing so, and was thereby alleged to be guilty of improper conduct or practice within the meaning of s 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act. The grounds of decision refer to the Legal Profession Act and the Rules of the Legal Profession Act. The applicant, the Law Society of Singapore, was represented by Teo Yi Hui of Pointer LLC. The judgment head is truncated and does not set out the court's ultimate disposition of the charges.

Summary

SUPREME COURT OF SINGAPORE

29 August 2024

Case summary

Law Society of Singapore v Nedumaran Muthukrishnan [2024] SGHC 218

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Decision of the Court of 3 Supreme Court Judges (delivered by Tay Yong Kwang JCA):

Outcome: The Court of 3 Supreme Court Judges found the respondent guilty of two charges of grossly improper conduct as an advocate and solicitor and ordered that the respondent be suspended from practice for a period of four years.

1 The respondent, Mr Nedumaran Muthukrishnan (the “Respondent”) was admitted as an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore on 25 May 1996. He faced four charges (the “Charges”) before a Disciplinary Tribunal (“DT”) constituted under s 90(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed) (“LPA”). The DT found that the Charges were proved beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly found cause of sufficient gravity pursuant to s 93(1)(c) of the LPA for referral to the Court of 3 Supreme Court Judges.

2 This was the application of the Law Society of Singapore (the “Law Society”) for the Respondent to show cause, in respect of the Charges, why he should not be sanctioned under s 83(1) of the LPA.

Background to the application

3 The complainant, Mr Chan Yee Huat (the “Complainant”), was acquainted with the Respondent in 2012 as he was then seeking legal representation for himself and some of the members of his family in various personal injury matters. During the period from 2013 to 2019, the Respondent represented the Complainant in various matters, of which three are relevant – HC/S 324/2016 (“Suit 324”), HC/S/325/2016 (“Suit 325”) (collectively, the “Suits”) and HC/S 52/2017 (“Suit 52”). The Complainant was the plaintiff in those three actions.

4 The Suits concerned the Complainant’s claims for personal injuries arising from motor vehicle accidents, for which settlements were reached and consent judgments were recorded. The Complainant was awarded $120,000 and $660,000 (excluding costs and disbursements) in Suit 324 and Suit 325 respectively. The Respondent obtained the Public Trustee’s approval for his costs in respect of Suit 325 on 6 December 2017 and Suit 324 on 4 May 2018, in accordance with the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act (Cap 189, 2000 Rev Ed) (the “MVA”).

5 He received cheques for $102,002.83 and $58,393.13 from the respective defendant’s solicitors in the Suits, totalling $160,395.96 (the “Sum”), which he used to set off the legal fees owed by the Complainant to him. In February 2020, the Complainant, who believed that the Sum was held by the Respondent on his behalf, contacted the Respondent and instructed him to utilise the Sum to make payments to various persons that the Complainant owed money to for their assistance in the Suits.

6 Over the course of various email correspondence from 9 March 2020 to 25 April 2020, the Respondent assured the Complainant multiple times that he had either made payment as instructed by the Complainant or that he was in the process of making the payments. However, these assurances turned out to be false as no payment was made to the intended recipients as instructed by the Complainant.

7 On 26 April 2021, the Complainant lodged a complaint with the Law Society, making various allegations against the Respondent. The DT was subsequently convened on 14 June 2022 to hear and investigate the complaints brought against the Respondent. The DT found that all four Charges were proved beyond reasonable doubt:

a. On the First Charge, the DT found that the Respondent was not honest and had strung the Complainant along by concealing the truth from him falsely and deliberately by representing in his multiple emails between 17 March 2020 and 17 April 2020 that he had posted or would shortly be posting or hand delivering cheques for the payments as requested by the Complainant.

b. On the Second Charge, the DT framed the issue as whether the Respondent, when he applied the Sum toward the settlement of his legal fees, obtained the Complainant’s prior consent and/or first informed him of his intention to set off the fees. The DT found that the Complainant was never told about the set-off prior to it being effected and therefore found the Respondent guilty on the Second Charge.

c. On the Third Charge, the DT found that the Respondent did not produce any evidence regarding the basis on which his professional fees would be charged as there was no invoice issued nor was there any letter of engagement signed. Accordingly, the DT found the Respondent guilty on the Third Charge.

d. On the Fourth Charge, the DT accepted the Respondent’s concession that the Sum was client’s money which was paid into the client’s account and that he applied the Sum to set off his professional fees without issuing any bill of costs. Accordingly, the DT found the Respondent guilty on the Fourth Charge.

8 In this application, the court was concerned that the parties in the DT proceedings might have overlooked a legal issue concerning the true nature of the Sum, in particular, whether the Sum belonged to the Complainant or to the Respondent. The court therefore invited further submissions from the parties on this issue.

Decision of the Court

9 The court acquitted the Respondent of the Second Charge. Pursuant to the legislative framework of the MVA, the Sum belonged to the Respondent after it was approved by the Public Trustee and paid by the solicitors representing the respective defendants in the Suits to the Respondent. Therefore, the Respondent was the beneficial owner of the Sum stated in the cheques of $58,393.13 in Suit 324 and $102,002.83 in Suit 325. Accordingly, the Second Charge, which was premised on the Respondent having received the Sum on behalf of the Complainant, was not made out: at [33] to [37].

10 The court also acquitted the Respondent of the Fourth Charge. Although the Respondent admitted under cross examination that the Sum was client’s money and that it was deposited into the client’s account, the issue of whether the Sum was client’s money is a legal issue which must be determined in accordance with the definition of “client’s money” under the Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Accounts) Rules (“SAR”). As the Respondent was the beneficial owner of the Sum, the Sum was not client’s money within the meaning given to it in r 2 of the SAR. Accordingly, the Fourth Charge, premised on a breach of r 7(1)(a)(iv) of the SAR, where a necessary element is that client’s money was withdrawn, was not made out: at [38] to [40].

11 The court found that due cause was established in respect of the First Charge. Despite the Respondent’s assertion at the hearing that he had explained the mechanism of the MVA to the Complainant, the Respondent did not appear to have understood the mechanism. It was clear that the Respondent misled the Complainant into believing that he would pay out the Sum to the recipients specified by the Complainant without any intention of doing so. The Respondent stated untruths knowingly, intentionally and continually to his client over some four weeks. The Respondent’s conduct was plainly dishonest and such conduct was clearly improper for an advocate and solicitor. The First Charge was therefore proved beyond reasonable doubt and due cause for sanction was established: at [41] to [47].

12 The court found that due cause was established in respect of the Third Charge. The duty to inform a client of the basis for charging fees under r 17(3)(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (“PCR”) is a prospective one which arises at the start of the professional relationship. The Respondent’s conduct in relation to the fee arrangements with the Complainant fell far short of the standard required under r 17(3)(a) of the PCR. He had only issued one invoice in 2013 and no invoice was issued in respect of the Suits and Suit 52. The Respondent was not able to substantiate his position that he had explained the basis for his fees to the Complainant at the beginning of the relationship because there was no formal letter of engagement or other documentary proof. Accordingly, the Third Charge was proved beyond reasonable doubt: at [48] to [54].

13 Since the Sum did not belong to the Complainant, there was in fact no dishonest misappropriation or mishandling of client’s money. As the Respondent was acquitted on the Second and Fourth Charges, the present case did not fall into the categories of cases warranting a presumptive sanction of striking off: at [59].

14 However, the extent of the Respondent’s dishonesty in the First Charge was protracted and was not a mere one-off incident. The untruths were repeated continually over some four weeks. The fact that the Respondent would engage in such dishonest communication, while believing erroneously that the Sum belonged to the Complainant, revealed a defect in character as a practitioner. The Respondent’s conduct fell far short of the standard of professionalism expected of an advocate and solicitor. In the circumstances, a lengthy period of suspension of four years was the appropriate sanction in respect of both the First and the Third Charges: at [60] to [64].

This summary is provided to assist in the understanding of the Court’s grounds of decision. It is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the Court. All numbers in bold font and square brackets refer to the corresponding paragraph numbers in the Court’s grounds of decision.

What charges did the respondent face in Law Society of Singapore v Nedumaran Muthukrishnan [2024] SGHC 218?

In Law Society of Singapore v Nedumaran Muthukrishnan [2024] SGHC 218, the respondent, admitted as an advocate and solicitor on 25 May 1996, faced four charges before a Disciplinary Tribunal under s 90(1) of the Legal Profession Act, the first alleging dishonest dealings with his client Chan Yee Huat.

Which judges decided Law Society of Singapore v Nedumaran Muthukrishnan [2024] SGHC 218?

Law Society of Singapore v Nedumaran Muthukrishnan [2024] SGHC 218 was decided by a Court of 3 Supreme Court Judges comprising Tay Yong Kwang JCA, who delivered the grounds of decision, with Debbie Ong Siew Ling JAD and Judith Prakash SJ, on 29 August 2024.