CHAN WAI LEEN, as the Administratrix of the estate of Wong Ching Fong, deceased (NRIC No. SXXXXXXXI), and in her personal capacity & Anor v HO DAT KHOON

[2024] SGHC(A) 24 High Court (Appellate Division) 28 August 2024 • AD/CA 57/2023 • 34 min read

4 cases cited Cited by 1 case

Outcome

Appeal dismissed

we dismissed the appeal.

Source: [2024] SGHC(A) 24, High Court (Appellate Division), decided 28 August 2024. Read directly from the judgment.

Key facts

Court	High Court (Appellate Division)
Decided	28 August 2024
Judges	Kannan Ramesh, Philip Jeyaretnam, Woo Bih Li
Charges / claim	Gifts, Civil Procedure
Outcome	Appeal dismissed
Counsel	Dentons Rodyk & Davidson LLP, Loh Eben Ong LLP, UniLegal LLC, Eben Ong Eng Tuan, Mok Zi Cong, Ng Hui Min, Ong Jade Yi, Ranvir Kumar Singh, Shiv Kumar Singh

Source: [2024] SGHC(A) 24, High Court (Appellate Division), decided 28 August 2024 — eLitigation. Updated 25 June 2026.

Catchwords

Gifts — Avoidance Civil Procedure — Costs

Practice Areas

Gifts Civil Procedure

Judges (3)

Kannan Ramesh Coram Philip Jeyaretnam Coram Woo Bih Li Delivered

Counsel (9)

Dentons Rodyk & Davidson LLP Firm Loh Eben Ong LLP Firm UniLegal LLC Firm Eben Ong Eng Tuan Counsel Respondent Mok Zi Cong Counsel Appellant Ng Hui Min Counsel Appellant Ong Jade Yi Counsel Respondent Ranvir Kumar Singh Counsel Respondent Shiv Kumar Singh Counsel Respondent

Parties (3)

Chan Wai Leen, as the administratrix of the estate of Wong Ching Fong, deceased, and in her personal capacity Appellant Ho Dat Khoon Respondent Wong Cai Juan Appellant

Case Significance

Chan Wai Leen (in her personal capacity and as the administratrix of the estate of Wong Ching Fong, deceased) and another v Ho Dat Khoon [2024] SGHC(A) 24 was decided by the Appellate Division of the High Court of Singapore in Civil Appeal No 57 of 2023, with Woo Bih Li JAD delivering the grounds of decision of the court, sitting with Kannan Ramesh JAD and Philip Jeyaretnam J. The appeal was heard on 7 May 2024 and the grounds were issued on 28 August 2024. It was an appeal against the decision of a judge in the General Division of the High Court in HC/S 1095/2020, the action having been commenced by Mdm Ho Dat Khoon as plaintiff against two defendants: Mdm Chan Wai Leen, sued as administratrix of the estate of her late husband Mr Wong Ching Fong (Alan) and in her personal capacity, and their second daughter Ms Wong Cai Juan.

The parties were related, Mr Wong having been the nephew of the plaintiff, making Mdm Chan the plaintiff's niece-in-law and Ms Wong Cai Juan a grandniece of the plaintiff. In Suit 1095, the plaintiff mainly sought to invalidate the transfer of a property at Emerald Hill Road from her to the second defendant. The catchwords identify the issues as the avoidance of gifts and civil procedure costs, and the matter engaged the Land Titles Act, the Legal Profession Act and the Supreme Court of Judicature Act. The appellants were represented by Dentons Rodyk & Davidson LLP, while Loh Eben Ong LLP and UniLegal LLC acted for the respondent.

Summary

SUPREME COURT OF SINGAPORE

28 August 2024

Case summary

Chan Wai Leen and another v Ho Dat Khoon [2024] SGHC(A) 24

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Decision of the Appellate Division of the High Court (delivered by Justice of the Appellate Division Woo Bih Li):

Outcome: The Appellate Division of the High Court dismisses the appeal by the appellants against the decision of a judge in the General Division of the High Court to invalidate the transfer of a property from the respondent to the second appellant and to order the appellants to pay the respondent party-to-party costs in the sum of $360,000 and reasonable disbursements in the sum of $123,019.17 with Goods and Services Tax at the rate of 8% and the usual statutory interest of 5.33% per annum on $360,000.

Background

1 This is an appeal against the decision of a judge in the General Division of the High Court (the “Judge”) in HC/S 1095/2020 (“Suit 1095”). The action below was commenced by Mdm Ho Dat Khoon (the “Plaintiff”) against two defendants (the “Defendants”). The first defendant was Mdm Chan Wai Leen (“Mdm Chan”), who was sued as the administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Mr Wong Ching Fong, Alan (“Mr Wong”), and in her personal capacity. The second defendant was their second daughter, Ms Wong Cai Juan (“D2”). Mr Wong was the nephew of the Plaintiff and hence Mdm Chan is the Plaintiff’s niece-in-law. D2 is a grandniece of the Plaintiff.

2 In Suit 1095, the Plaintiff mainly sought to invalidate the transfer of a property at Emerald Hill Road (the “Property”) from her to D2. On 2 December 2016, the Plaintiff had signed an instrument of transfer (the “Transfer”) of the Property in favour of D2 as the sole transferee. She also signed a will on the same day (the “2016 Will”). However, the Plaintiff claimed that she had not intended to make an inter vivos gift when she executed the Transfer. The Judge found that the Transfer was made under a mistake, and ordered the cancellation of the registration of the Transfer as well as the rectification of the land-register to reflect the Plaintiff’s continued ownership over the Property. The Judge also ordered the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff party-to-party costs in the sum of $360,000 and reasonable disbursements in the sum of $123,019.17 with Goods and Services Tax (“GST”) at the rate of 8% and the usual statutory interest of 5.33% per annum on $360,000. The Defendants then appealed.

3 On 2 December 2016, the Plaintiff was 76 years of age. The trial was held in May 2022. She was 81 years of age then. She had five other siblings, including her sister who passed away in 2017, Mdm Ho Tat Noor (“Mdm HTN”). One of Mdm HTN’s children was Mr Wong. The Plaintiff’s siblings also included her brother who passed away in 2017, Mr Ho Tat Song (“Mr HTS”). Mr HTS had six children, two of whom are Mr Ho Chiuen Sheey and Ms Nicola Reece Sheffield Ho Chuien Yheeg (He Junyu). On 30 April 2020, pursuant to a Power of Attorney, they became the attorneys of the Plaintiff (the “Attorneys”). The Attorneys were involved in obtaining legal advice and giving evidence on behalf of the Plaintiff for her claim.

4 In 1970, the Plaintiff’s late father purchased the Property and registered it in the Plaintiff’s name. It was the Plaintiff’s only property. On 2 December 2016, she signed the Transfer in favour of D2 as the sole transferee. The Transfer was then registered in D2’s name in 2017. The Transfer stated that the Transfer was made “BY WAY OF GIFT”. As mentioned, the Plaintiff also executed the 2016 Will which expressed her intention for the Property to be a testamentary gift to D2. Mr David Liew Tuck Yin (“Mr Liew”) acted for the Plaintiff in the preparation and execution of the Transfer and the 2016 Will.

5 On 13 November 2020, the Plaintiff commenced Suit 1095 against the Defendants, mainly claiming that the Transfer should be set aside as she did not intend to make an inter vivos gift to D2 when she executed the Transfer. Her action, however, did not seek to invalidate the 2016 Will, although she also took the position that she did not intend to make the bequest to D2 under the 2016 Will. The Plaintiff relied on medical reports to prove that she was not fully aware of what she was doing when she signed the Transfer and that her cognition was likely to have been affected to a significant degree due to her various medical conditions. The Plaintiff also submitted that she was the legal and beneficial owner of the Property prior to the Transfer and was not, as the Defendants suggested, holding the Property on trust for Mdm HTN’s family. The Plaintiff sought to reverse the Transfer on the bases of: (a) total lack of consideration; (b) mistake; (c) unconscionability; and (d) undue influence. She also argued that she was entitled to rectification of the land-register under s 160 of the Land Titles Act 1993 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “LTA”), paragraph 14 of the First Schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed), and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the court.

6 On the other hand, the Defendants essentially argued at trial that the Plaintiff had the mental capacity to execute the Transfer, and in fact, held the Property on trust for Mdm HTN’s family, in line with the intentions of her late father who had purchased the Property. In the alternative, the Defendants submitted that the Plaintiff had intended to give the Property to HTN’s family, which included D2. They also argued that the Plaintiff had, at all material times, the benefit of independent legal advice, received explanations of the documents which she signed, and was fully aware of the nature, effect, and consequences of the Transfer.

7 The Judge dismissed the Defendants’ allegation of a trust or a gift and set aside the Transfer.

8 The Defendants appealed against the decision of the Judge but no longer relied on the trust allegation.

Decision

9 The Appellate Division of the High Court (the “court”) dismissed the appeal and ordered the Defendants to pay the costs of the appeal to the Plaintiff forthwith fixed at $52,000 including disbursements. The court also said it would direct the Registrar of the Supreme Court to refer the conduct of Mr Liew to the Law Society of Singapore (the “Law Society”): at [4].

The Defendants’ evidence

10 The court was entitled to consider all the evidence. This included the evidence for the Defendants. While the legal burden and evidential burden both fell on the Plaintiff at the start of her case, upon her adducing some (not inherently incredible) evidence to establish her case, the evidential burden would have shifted to the Defendants to adduce some evidence in rebuttal: at [24].

11 It was significant that although the Defendants relied on the gift argument on appeal, their evidence on affidavit for the trial did not elaborate on this allegation. Any subsequent evidence from the Defendants to sustain the gift argument was too little and too late: at [25].

The Plaintiff’s mental capacity at the time of the Transfer

12 There was no reason to disagree with the Judge that the evidence presented by the doctors on the Plaintiff’s mental capacity at the time of the Transfer showed that although the Plaintiff suffered from various ailments and conditions, she did have mental capacity at the time of the Transfer: at [27].

13 Although the Plaintiff was found to have mental capacity at the time of the Transfer, that is not to say that the medical evidence was entirely irrelevant. It provided important background context as to the Plaintiff’s physical and mental state: at [28].

The 2003 Will, the 2013 Will and the application for a replacement certificate of title of the Property in 2014

14 The Defendants argued that the Plaintiff had all along evinced an intention to benefit Mdm HTN’s family with the Property, and that this intention was evinced in three separate wills, ie, a will executed in 2003 (the “2003 Will”), a will executed in 2013 (the “2013 Will”), and the 2016 Will.

15 The 2003 Will was irrelevant to the appeal as the Defendants could not find a copy of the 2003 Will to begin with: at [30].

16 The circumstances leading to the execution of the 2013 Will and the execution of documents for a replacement certificate of title of the Property in 2014 did not provide much support to the Defendants’ contention that the Plaintiff knew what she was doing when she signed the Transfer and the 2016 Will: at [29] to [44].

The 2016 Will and the Transfer

17 The Plaintiff did not understand the nature and effect of the Transfer. In particular, Mr Liew’s conduct in acting for the Plaintiff caused the court concern as to whether Mr Liew had acted in the best interest of the Plaintiff: at [45].

18 First, the evidence revealed that it was Mdm Chan who contacted the office of Mr Liew. According to Mr Liew, the Plaintiff’s instructions were about: (a) the transfer of the Property to D2 within the lifetime of the Plaintiff and the relevant stamp duty implications; and/or (b) giving the Property through a will. He said he was instructed to prepare a draft will while the Plaintiff discussed with the family of Mdm Chan about payment of stamp duty on a transfer. He allegedly spoke to the Plaintiff in a mixture of Cantonese and Mandarin and the Plaintiff confirmed that she understood Cantonese (although it was the Plaintiff’s position that she did not understand Cantonese). Furthermore, he was instructed to and agreed to send all documents and correspondence directly to the Plaintiff’s grandnieces, including D2, as they would be able to explain the contents thereof to her since she did not read or write English. The Plaintiff also explained that she was not staying at the Property and hence it was not convenient to send documents to the Property: at [46].

19 Second, after taking instructions from the Plaintiff, Mr Liew prepared a draft will. Mdm Chan’s evidence was that she was contacted by Mr Liew’s office to collect the draft will. She did so and purportedly explained it to the Plaintiff. She then called Mr Liew’s office to say that the Plaintiff had confirmed the contents of the draft and was ready to sign a transfer. Mr Liew was subsequently informed by Christina that the Plaintiff had approved the draft will, and to prepare a transfer of the Property to D2. He did not confirm any of this with the Plaintiff in person or over the telephone, although he alleged that he did have a second telephone discussion with her about the Transfer in which he allegedly informed her that she could get her own lawyers to represent her in the Transfer. However, there was no attendance note of this alleged conversation. It was unclear who subsequently gave instructions over the telephone for Mr Liew to meet the Plaintiff for her to execute the 2016 Will and the Transfer: at [47] to [48].

20 Third, Mr Liew eventually met the Plaintiff on the day that she executed the Transfer and the 2016 Will, ie, 2 December 2016. This was not at his office or at her workplace or residence, but at a location near her workplace. He noticed that she appeared hurried, and he was under the impression that she wanted to get the signing over and done with as quickly as possible, but did not question this: at [49].

21 According to Mr Liew, he went through the documents individually with the Plaintiff in a mixture of Cantonese and Mandarin. He also explained that she had to sign the Transfer to obtain an assessment of stamp duty. He had emphasised to her that the signature on the Transfer did not mean that the Transfer had taken place as stamp duty had to be paid. That meeting was around 15 to 30 minutes long. Mr Liew did not make an attendance note of that meeting: at [50].

22 At no point in time did Mr Liew ever ascertain with the Plaintiff whether she had other relatives and why she was giving the Property to D2 only, whether by way of an inter vivo gift or a will. Neither did he advise her on the prudence of such a course of action and the likelihood or possibility that it might invite litigation from other relatives. The meeting on 2 December 2016 appeared to be for the primary purpose of executing the documents without more, rather than to first ascertain for himself whether the Plaintiff truly understood her purported instructions: at [51].

23 The court thus had doubts as to whether Mr Liew had properly taken the Plaintiff’s instructions in relation to the 2016 Will and the Transfer, as well as whether the Plaintiff understood the nature and effect of the Transfer: at [52].

24 In summary, the court was persuaded by the evidence that the Plaintiff did not understand the nature and effect of the Transfer and that she did not at any point intend to give the Property to D2 or anyone else for that matter. While the court had reservations about the Judge’s finding that the Plaintiff had validly executed the 2016 Will, the court did not make any finding with respect to the validity of the 2016 Will as the appeal did not raise this issue: at [45] and [53].

Rectification

25 The court was entitled to order rectification of the land register: at [54] to [61].

Costs and disbursements

26 The court upheld the Judge’s decision on costs and disbursements including GST: [62] to [67].

Mr Liew’s conduct

27 It seemed that Mr Liew might not have acted in the best interest of the Plaintiff in respect of both the Transfer and the 2016 Will: at [68] to [76].

28 The court directed the Registrar of the Supreme Court to refer the conduct of Mr Liew to the Law Society of Singapore for its Council to refer the matter to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel under s 85(3)(a) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed) to inquire whether Mr Liew had acted in the best interest of the Plaintiff in the entire process leading to the execution of the Transfer and the 2016 Will: at [78].

This summary is provided to assist in the understanding of the Court’s grounds of decision. It is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the Court. All numbers in bold font and square brackets refer to the corresponding paragraph numbers in the Court’s grounds of decision.

What was Chan Wai Leen v Ho Dat Khoon [2024] SGHC(A) 24 about?

It was an Appellate Division appeal (Civil Appeal No 57 of 2023) from HC/S 1095/2020, in which Mdm Ho Dat Khoon had sought to invalidate the transfer of a property at Emerald Hill Road to Ms Wong Cai Juan. The catchwords concern avoidance of gifts and civil procedure costs.

Which judges decided Chan Wai Leen v Ho Dat Khoon [2024] SGHC(A) 24?

The Appellate Division of the High Court decided it on 28 August 2024, with Woo Bih Li JAD delivering the grounds of decision of the court, sitting alongside Kannan Ramesh JAD and Philip Jeyaretnam J. The appeal had been heard on 7 May 2024.