WPG v WPF

1 The parties married in 2009 and have two children, a daughter aged 15 and a son aged 4, at the time the interim judgment was granted. Their marriage began to deteriorate significantly from October 2019, when they began living apart but this is disputed by the appellant (husband) on appeal.

2 The respondent (wife) alleged numerous incidents of the appellant’s unreasonable behaviour from October 2019, including incidents of domestic and harassment, threats, and financial neglect.

3 The first major incident allegedly occurred on 23 October 2019 where the appellant accused the respondent wife of having an affair with her classmate and became violent, kicking her in the stomach, holding her by her neck, and pushing her forcefully against a window without a grill. This prompted the respondent to make a police report. The appellant’s suspicions about infidelity persisted and in January 2020, under constant demand by the appellant, the respondent agreed to a prenatal paternity test for their younger child, which revealed that the child was indeed the appellant’s. During this period, the appellant allegedly pawned the respondent’s jewellery to pay for the paternity test and humiliated her publicly by telling friends and their church members that the baby was not his.

4 The pattern of harassment and threats continued throughout 2020 to 2021. The respondent claimed that the appellant repeatedly demanded money from her, threatened to make her bedbound, followed her to public places where he would shout and threaten to expose alleged extramarital affairs to her workplace, tracked her to a friend's home, created a disturbance there, and threatened her social circle by warning other friends not to contact her or face consequences.

5 On 4 February 2021, the respondent claimed that the appellant assaulted her again by holding her neck and pushing her against a wall in their master bedroom. He had also called her office asking to see her boss and called the respondent’s close friends. The respondent was thus compelled to apply for a personal protection order (“PPO”) against him.

6 Their relationship deteriorated further in late 2021 and early 2022 when the respondent alleged that on 29 November 2021, the appellant destroyed the CCTV in their master bedroom and kept kicking the bedroom door. Throughout January and February 2022, he engaged in a pattern of stalking and threatening behaviour, following the respondent around in their home and in public and attempting to forcibly take her son from her, leading to multiple police reports filed.

7 In an attempt at reconciliation, the appellant arranged a mediation before two church members on 5 February 2022. The mediation failed when the respondent refused to withdraw her PPO application, leading to another altercation. The appellant subsequently reported the respondent to her workplace on 7 February 2022, for actions that “seriously damaged the reputation” of the hospital she was working at.

8 On 16 March 2022, the parties signed an agreement (witnessed by a solicitor) stating that the respondent agrees to withdraw her PPO application in exchange for the appellant’s promise of good behaviour (“Agreement”). The Agreement stipulated that if the appellant breached the good behaviour clauses, the divorce would proceed by consent with specific arrangements for property division. The respondent thus withdrew her PPO application on 22 March 2022.

9 The acrimonious relationship between the parties resumed almost immediately after the Agreement was signed. On 28 March 2022, there was another altercation near the solicitor’s premises. Finally, on 17 July 2022, the appellant allegedly returned to the matrimonial home having tested positive for Covid-19, violating isolation protocols and endangering the family’s health.

10 The respondent filed for divorce on 4 August 2022, nearly three years before the interim judgment was granted. The appellant contested the divorce strenuously, leading to significant delays. The appellant filed a striking out application on 12 June 2023, which was dismissed by the assistant registrar. He then appealed this decision to the District Court and subsequently to the High Court, but his appeal was eventually dismissed on 29 July 2024.

11 The contested divorce hearing was originally scheduled for 13 August 2024 but was adjourned nine times — each time the appellant claims to be suffering from his heart ailments. When the hearing finally proceeded on 9 September 2024, it was conducted remotely to accommodate the appellant’s medical condition. However, the appellant had pre-arranged for an ambulance to arrive during the hearing. After the respondent completed her evidence-in-chief, the appellant refused to cross-examine her and the hearing was terminated when the ambulance arrived.

12 The appellant subsequently filed a recusal application against the District Judge in the court below which was heard and dismissed by me in a hearing on 30 September 2024. Notwithstanding that, the appellant refused to proceed with the divorce proceedings thereafter.

13 Due to his continued refusal to participate in oral cross-examination, the District Judge directed an exchange of written questions by 7 October 2024 and reply affidavits by 18 October 2024. The hearing was adjourned to 22 October 2024, then further adjourned to allow the appellant’s appeal regarding the recusal application to be heard. The appellant also filed an application for a stay of proceedings pending his application for recusal. That was heard and dismissed on 23 October 2024.

14 The High Court appeal regarding the recusal application was initially fixed before me for 19 November 2024 and 11 December 2024 but was adjourned yet again on account of the appellant’s heart condition. I eventually heard and dismissed the appeal on 28 February 2025.

15 Throughout this time, only the respondent filed her reply affidavit (on 16 October 2024) responding to the written cross-examination questions. The appellant did not respond to the respondent’s questions. The contested divorce hearing was adjourned a total of nine times across ten fixtures between August 2024 and March 2025.

16 Finally, on 5 March 2025, after more than two and a half years since the divorce writ was filed, the District Judge granted interim judgment in favour of the respondent, finding that the marriage had irretrievably broken down due to the appellant’s unreasonable behaviour. The appellant appealed against this decision.

17 On 22 January 2026, the day before the appeal, the appellant suffered another heart failure and he emailed a medical report to the registry stating that he was not able to attend court. The respondent appeared in person in the appeal.

18 From the affidavits of the parties and findings of the court below, it seemed to me that the marriage already broke down in 2019 and there were no signs of recovery although the appellant resisted every move by the respondent to formally end the marriage.

19 The appellant may have a weak heart but it stoutly persisted in perfectly timed failures — nine times — either on the eve of court proceedings or on the day of the proceedings itself; and even once in the midst of a hearing when it appeared that the proceedings were not going his way. His heart problem on the 23 January 2026 was the tenth to have stymied a court hearing. His medical report could only say that the appellant “complained of chest pain at rest”, which seems to me, the polite way of saying that there were no clinical symptoms, and without further tests, the attending physician could only take the appellant’s word for it. It was, thus not an emergency.

20 Although the medical certificate was authentic and excused the appellant from attending court, the background of the appellant’s serial heart failures led me to conclude that it was more than a physical impediment to the appellant attending court. I was convinced from the evidence of his past conduct, that he had no intention of pursuing his appeal. Furthermore, the respondent and their two young children must carry on with their lives without this matter blighting them without end. From the record, it also seemed to me that there was no merit in the appeal. The appellant must accept that when it is time to end, it is best to have a graceful end, so that everyone, including himself, may begin anew.

21 I therefore dismissed the appeal. The respondent may proceed to finalise the ancillary matters of the divorce.